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CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF
THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC AND
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN
PLURAL DEMOCRACIES:
LESSONS AND CAUTIONARY TALES
FROM SOUTH-EAST ASIA
Li-ann Thio*
I. MANAGING BABEL1
An enduring problem for constitutional design and democratic
practice within the context of a plural society with ethnic, religious
and linguistic religious minorities is the need to address the fears
and aspirations of these groups in relation to threats to their
identity and autonomy.2 It is difficult to secure unity in the face of
* Ph.D. (Cambridge); LL.M (Harvard); B.A. (Hons)(Oxford), Barrister (Gray‟s Inn,
UK), Professor of Law, National University of Singapore; sometime Member of
Singapore Parliament (Nominated), (Eleventh Session, 2007-2009). This article
builds on a paper presented at the Regional Conference on Constitutional
Democracy in Africa in the 21st Century: Challenges, Best Practices and
Opportunities, Nairobi, Kenya, 19-22nd August 2008, convened by the Kenyan
Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs in collaboration
with the Institute for Global Engagement.
1 LI-ANN THIO, MANAGING BABEL: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at xxvii (2005). (“The gap between the
ideal of a common humanity and the sober realities of the lack of solidarity among
groups of human beings is encapsulated in the ancient spectre and symbol of
„Babel‟. In Judeo-Christian tradition, the origin of nations and languages is
traced to Babel where God disrupted the unity of mankind, who then shared a
common language, by multiplying their tongues. Messianic prophecy looks
towards the day when this fracture will be healed and the vision of the universal
brotherhood of humankind restored and realised. The traditional test for the
existence of a nation was that of language, which was considered „an outward sign
of a group‟s peculiar identity‟. Babel is deployed here as a metaphor for a
universalist vision of humanity, which underscores the egalitarian tenets of
human rights law, but a vision tempered by an appreciation of human history.
This history is characterised by diversity, conflicting agendas with respect to
autonomy or control over resources and peoples and in some cases, by ethnic and
religious hatred, xenophobia and aggressive nationalism which demonises and
excludes the „Other‟.”). Id.
2 See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, Annex, U.N. Doc.
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the disintegrative tendencies of profound ethnic and cultural
conflict. Divided societies pose a deep problem for democratic
government where bare majoritarianism must be qualified by
counter-majoritarian checks. It is crucial to nation-building and
economic development, which facilitates basic standards of living,
to succeed in the continuing endeavor to resolve inter-group
conflict which disrupts social stability and fuels separatist
sentiments.
To this end, the imposition of a mono-ethnic state on a multiethnic society or a uniform religion on a religiously diverse society
would be a futile and dangerous route to tread. This is because
“[t]hose who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of
opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”3
Peace and a just order are integral to a state based on the rule
of law. Constitutions play an important, though non-exclusive,
role in articulating standards, guaranteeing rights, and
establishing institutions and processes which safeguard normative
aspirations such as respect for human dignity, ethnic and religious
diversity and social harmony, political freedoms, and basic
standards of material welfare. Added to this is the task of
structuring a government strong enough to govern and to facilitate
human welfare and economic development as national priorities.
Constitutional government informed by the principles of
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law contribute towards
the eradication of corruption, political oppression, economic
privation, and the development of a just system of ordered liberty.4
This requires a vision of the constitution as a justice-seeking
instrument rather than merely as a tool for the efficient pursuit of
A/RES/47/135/Annex (Dec. 18, 1992). Minority concerns usually relate to (1)
Recognition of Identity and Non-Discrimination; (2) Cultural rights such as
language rights, educational rights; (3) respect for their religion and traditional
customs and (4) participation through political representation and in economic
development.
3 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4 A constitutional system which nurtures constitutionalism would include
the delimitation of public powers by the Constitution which courts judicially
enforce, with judicial review being initiated by any party that feels aggrieved by
law or executive action. The law must safeguard the equal treatment of all
persons and the purposes for which discretionary powers are conferred must be
clearly identified to promote a fair and reasonable exercise of these powers, rather
than arbitrary exercises.
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public policy and to maintain public order. 5 The function of the
constitution may include the identification of a national identity or
shared public values, erecting institutional safeguards to hold
abuses of power accountable and stipulating processes by which
legislation and executive action acquire legitimacy.6 Increasingly,
“the very definition of the state . . . must reflect the ethnic
diversity of the polity, and acknowledge that the state is an
aggregation of ethnically and linguistically distinct regions and
sometimes of several distinct nationalities.”7
Legal structures are often constructed to respond to a range of
„harms‟ or „wrongs‟ a vulnerable minority group fears or has
historically experienced.8
These would include coercive
assimilation, state endorsed settlement schemes designed to alter
the dominant regional status of minorities, and the worst-case
scenario of genocide.9 In the task of nation-building and political
maturation, there is a dual imperative to secure space for groups
who wish to preserve their distinct traits and lifestyle and to
ensure that their individual members enjoy and appreciate the
equal rights and obligations that attend citizenship in a common
polity.10 To cohere this polity, the task must be founded on shared
5 See generally Ruth Gavison, What Belongs in a Constitution, 13 CONST.
POL. ECON. 89, 89-105 (2002); DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN 17 (2006).
6 Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 14546 (2003); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Legitimacy in the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. R.
1787; CARL J. FRIEDRICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT: A COMPARISON 110 (1974).
7 Neelan Tiruchelvam, The Crisis of Constitutionalism: South Asian
Perspectives, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: TRANSITIONS IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD 361, 363 (Douglas Greenberg et al. eds., 1993).
8 These may include:
(a) exclusion from public and private sector
employment opportunities because of language or religious requirements; (b)
exclusion from high public office; (c) denial of land ownership rights; (d) refusal to
allow minorities to hold elected office on the basis of language or other
discriminatory criterion; (e) economic development projects in minority regions
which benefit the majority instead of the minority; (f) expropriation of traditional
lands without proper compensation or transmigration policies; (g) refusal to use
minority language in public schools and administration where warranted by
substantial numbers of speaks of a minority language; (h) discriminatory denial of
citizenship rights; and (i) prohibiting minority language and religious practices in
private.
9 See, e.g., THIO, supra note 1, at 129-132; Johannes Morsink, Cultural,
Genocide, the UDHR and Minority Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 1009 (1999).
10 Joel E. Oestrerich, Liberal Theory and Minority Group Rights, 21 HUM.
RTS. Q. 108 (1999); Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in MODERN LAW OF
SELF-DETERMINATION 225-52 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); WILL KYMLICKA,
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fundamental values and all citizens, whether they belong to a
majority or minority groups, must have the opportunity to be
socialized in and to effectively participate in public life, in its
political, economic and social-cultural dimensions.11
The vulnerability of racial and religious minorities to
disadvantage, exclusion, or maltreatment often stems from their
numerical inferiority and resulting political margin-alization.12 In
this context, the specter of majoritarian tyranny may arise where
laws do not apply equally to citizens who are governed instead by
Unadulterated
the pull of ethnic or religious affiliations.13
democracy is literally the expressed will of the majority; it is
“silent on many issues regarding human rights and restraint of
power.”14 Furthermore, division can be imported where political
entrepreneurs “prey on parochialism, religion and other similar
distinctions.”15
MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
11 The 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action urged the
promotion of the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities, urging states to adopt
appropriate measures which included those which would facilitate minorities in
their “full participation in all aspects of the political, economic, social, religious
and cultural life of society and in the economic progress and development in their
country.” Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, pt. II, ¶¶ 25-27, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). See also Organization for the Security and
Cooperation in Europe: High Commissioner on National Minorities, Lund
Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public
Life,
HCNM.GAL/4/99
(June
30,
1999),
available
at
http://www.osce.org/hcnm/23623.html; Krzysztof Drzewicki, Ten Years of the Lund
Recommendations on the Effectiveness Participation of National Minorities in
Public Life: Reflections on Progress and Unfinished Business, 16 INT‟L J. ON
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 511 (2009).
12 Minority group members can be outvoted on matters critical to the survival
of their community which is a threat not faced by members of majority
communities since they usually can protect their own interests through their
control of the state machinery.
13 Tiruchelvem, supra note 7, at 362. In the South Asian context, the focus of
post Independence constitutional discourse shifted from an anti-colonialist
concern with independence and popular sovereignty to “the need for restraints on
the majoritarian principle.” Id. This is because as culturally resurgent majorities
began to flex their political muscle and deploy legislative and executive power “to
deny equal treatment to ethnic and cultural minorities, a vote in the hands of an
intolerant majority was soon viewed as an instrument of oppression.” Id.
14 Lawrence W. Beer, Introduction: Constitutionalism in Asia and the United
States, in CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 1, 12
(Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1992).
15 Yash Ghai, The Theory of the State in the Third World and the
Problematics of Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
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Constitutions as a political technology designed to organize
power, are predicated on a distrust of human nature and a greater
faith in institutions to channel and restrain power by setting the
legitimate borders of government action. As the supreme law of
the land subject to a special amendment procedure, constitutions
are designed to be above populist passions, most notably, by
containing counter-majoritarian checks as a form of a long-term
pre-commitment strategy framing a constitutional bargain, along
whose terms a minority group may accede to membership in a new
polity. In a sense, this insulates the Good from the vagaries of the
popular and majoritarian overreaching.
A constitution may contribute to the pacification of minorities,
mute ethnic tensions, and promote the peaceful co-existence of
disparate groups within the state framework by promoting their
effective protection, recognition, and participation in all aspects of
public life. This would include enshrining government structures
which guarantee minority representation as well as implementing
modes of accountability which may be activated where minority
rights and/or concerns are adversely affected. This may take the
form of:
(1) A general individual rights regime based on the norm of nondiscrimination; the focus is on a shared life in the common domain as
equal citizens.
(2) Special measures or minority group rights over and above general
human rights; these may relate to religious, cultural and linguistic
freedom, educational rights, participatory rights in relation to
shaping local and national policy, and the right to maintain crossfrontier contacts with a focus on securing equality.
(3) Schemes of minority protection which center around positive
government obligations rather than justiciable rights; these may
include the creation of separate courts or dispute resolution
mechanisms to protect cultural practices; affirmative action
programs or non-territorial forms of autonomy, e.g., equal state
support to all educational institutions providing basic standards, set
and monitored by the state, are met.
(4) In some cases, particularly where ethnic-religious cleavages are
territorially based, forms of spatial autonomy such as federalism,
TRANSITIONS
eds., 1993).

IN THE
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confederalism, and confederation16 may be useful methods to adopt
pursuant to the principle of “internal self-determination.” 17

Constitutions cannot create social utopias and, as Lutz notes,
they are “supposed to aid the moving of conflict from the streets
and the battlefields to arenas of compromise and persuasion, and
not to produce peace per se.”18 Certain performance criteria by
which we may evaluate the quality of a „constitutional democracy,‟
which does not exist by mere dint of the existence of a
constitutional text, include:
(1) A constitution that is followed rather than ignored;
(2) A constitution based on and supportive of the rule of law;
(3) Free elections involving essentially all of the adult population;
(4) Two or more competitive parties; and
(5) At least one peaceful transfer of power between competitive
parties or between significantly different party coalitions, through
the free electoral process, or else confidence that an electoral outcome
that would replace the currently dominant party or party coalition
would be accepted peacefully.19

At the end of the day, it is not merely the form of
constitutional government that is important; rather, the
constitutional culture or ethos of tolerance and mutual respect are
important in maintaining social peace.
A plural society or
community that desires peace and an integrated society must set
its face against ethnic and religious hatred and aggressive
nationalism which demonizes and excludes the „Other‟. It must
both honor and give expression to a constitutional culture
16 This involves two elements: first, power-sharing, which “denotes the
participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political
decision making, especially at the executive level;” second, group autonomy
entails giving groups “authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the
areas of education and culture.” Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Design for Divided
Societies,
15
J.
DEMOC.
96,
97
(2004),
available
at
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris/ACROBAT/stm103.%20
articles/lijphart%20Constitutional_Design.pdf.%20articles/lijphart%20Constitutio
nal_Design.pdf.
17 THIO, supra note 1, at 19.
18 Donald Lutz, Thinking About Constitutionalism at the Start of the TwentyFirst Century, 30 PUBLIUS 115, 125 (2000).
19 Id. at 119.
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respectful of human and group rights and committed to sustaining
ethnic-religious pluralism within the national order. Beyond rulefollowing and legalism, attention must be paid to the quality of
constitutional norms and the public values espoused. Only then
can a true spirit of inclusive fraternity displace the wry
observation that “if all men are brothers, the ruling model is Cain
and Abel.”20
This article seeks to set out principles to optimize the
constitutional accommodation of ethnic and religious minorities in
plural societies committed to constitutional democracy. It draws
from international standards and the lessons of best and worst
practices which may be gleaned from the constitutional practice of
various South-East Asian constitutional orders whose societies are
racially and religiously diverse. A key idea is that a wellfunctioning civil society is not nurtured by enforced uniformity, but
by tolerance and mutual respect for different racial and religious
groups. If members of a politically non-dominant minority group
feel protected by laws and legal processes, and if citizenship is
inclusive, this will solidify their commitment to the state and
enable them to focus on what is shared, rather than what divides,
in cultivating a sense of common citizenship.
Constitutions speak to the economic, political, and social
dimensions of state-society relations, both constituting and being
constituted by these ground-level realities. Items on the menu of
options, which may inform a constitutional minority protection
scheme pursuant to preserving the multi-ethnic character of the
polity, include individual rights relating to religious freedom and
equal protection clauses, special group rights such as linguistic or
cultural rights, permanent affirmative action programs to equalize
opportunities, pluralism, forms of secularism, and power-sharing
schemes.21 The protection of religious freedom and the linguistic
and cultural traits of minorities are not optional extras but are
essential to the workings of constitutional democracy in a plural
society. The denial of human rights flows from undemocratic,
20

1249.

Arthur Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229,

21 Such schemes could go beyond the elected branch of government to include
the civil service, judiciary, police, and military, e.g., through specifying ethnic
quotas or through a broad constitutional provision an favoring the general
objective of broad representation, which the government can be charged with
practically implementing.
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authoritarian rule and an absence of constitutionalism. Thus, all
sectors of society should have a role in the making of the
constitution and its practical operation through the legal
techniques of rights, duties to consult in forming policies which
affect minority interests, legislative oversight bodies and agencies
able to receive complaints about minority abuses in order to
investigate these complaints, and remedial mechanisms to correct
such abuses. This buttresses the legitimacy and durability of the
constitution where stakeholders have a role in its formation and
subsequent operation. This would also include the ability to
activate a sufficiently muscular checks and balances scheme and to
have effective formal and informal channels to shape the
legislative agenda. An optimal balance must be sought between
recognizing minority status, permitting some degree of selfgovernment, and integration with society at large. This could
include:
(1) Measures to ensure effective participation in national
government, including the allocation of resources to autonomous
areas;
(2) Measures to encourage power-sharing in deeply divided societies
and those with many different ethnic or other groups;
(3) Measures to ensure appropriate communal balance in law
enforcement, including recruitment to the police, the army and the
judiciary; and
(4) Measures to ensure fair participation of members of minorities in
mainstream economic activity, including employment in the public
and major private sectors.22

II. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH – REMEDIAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM (CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION AND
CONFLICT PREVENTION)
A. The Internal North-South Divide: When Economic

U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Danish Centre for Human Rights,
Working Group on Minorities, 8th session, Report of an International Seminar on
Autonomist and Integrationist Approaches to Minority Protection, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2002/WP.1 (Apr. 3-4, 2002).
22

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol22/iss1/2

8

2010]

MINORITIES IN PLURAL DEMOCRACIES

51

Underdevelopment Correlates with Racial-Religious Minorities
A crucial component to political stability is healthy economic
growth. It requires a rule of law-based state to facilitate legal
certainty and stability, and is integral to attracting foreign
investment and trade, and to underpinning financial services and
commerce. Following from this, one clear source of social agitation
is where there is an inequitable distribution of economic fruits
between the core-periphery, in relation to resource management
and profit allocation.
For example, previously, the Indonesian government with its
center in the Javanese center of Jakarta did not fairly share
revenue with the province of Aceh in Sumatra derived from the
province‟s considerable forestry, gas, and oil resources, which
constituted 11% to 15% of Indonesia‟s total export earnings.23 Of
this, only 5% was returned to Aceh through development subsidies,
perpetuating the state of under-development through such uneven
investment flows and exploitative economic policies.24 This was
addressed by the Special Autonomy Law on Nanggroe Acheh
Darussalam (Law No. 18 of 2001), which effects a redistribution of
revenue whereby Aceh is to receive 70% of oil revenues rather than
the current 5% and 80% of the agricultural and fishing revenues.25
Legislation, by effecting redistributive justice, promotes peaceful
co-existence and empowers minority groups to realize their right of
internal self-determination. Social justice and development is an
integral aspect of the peace architecture.
Ethnic conflict aggravated by economic disparity between the
core and periphery may be compounded by a sense of historical
grievance and a desire fueled by a resurgent religious fervor which
translates into a political movement to place a different social
system on a formal legal basis, such as the desire to impose hudud
law in Aceh.26 This is exacerbated when a dominant majority tries
23 Li-ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia-Pacific Region, in
SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 297-354, 322 (Marcelo G. Kohen
ed., 2006).
24 Id. at 322.
25 Mega Offers Aceh More Autonomy, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 16, 2001, at
4.
26 The Achinese constitute 90% of the population in Sumatra and take pride
in their distinct 400 year history as an important Islamic sultanate before coming
under the control of the Dutch East Indies colonies. ANTHONY SMITH, ACEH, SELF
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to impose its language and culture to coercively assimilate a nondominant minority. For example, attempts to impose the Thai
language and Buddhist culture on the Pattani Malay in South
Thailand have fueled calls by the Pattani United Liberation Front
for a separate Islamic territory.27 This resistance to “Siamisation”
is com-pounded by a sense of regional grievance that stems from
the under-developed nature of southern Thailand relative to the
rest of the country. The exacerbation of socio-economic cleavages
and the economic “north-south” divided by racial-religious
differentiation also shapes the character of the Mindanao question
in south Philippines. This economically under-developed region
which is plagued by violence, fueling insecurity, sustains
separatist sentiment.28 Various separ-atists groups such as the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (“MILF”) have been raging a bloody
separatist war since 1978 for an independent Islamic state in
Mindanao, which is rich in minerals.29 The Muslim Moros, who
make up 5% of the Philippines‟ eighty-two million population,
nurse a sense of grievance, united by a strong ethnic or religious
identity, against the majority Catholic Filipinos, fearing the
weakening of their religious-cultural traditions through coercive
assimilationist measures, as well as a dilution of their numbers
through Catholic transmigration.30 Attempts at concluding peace

DETERMINATION CONFLICT PROFILE, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (2002),
http://selfdetermine.irc-online.org/conflicts/aceh.html.
27 Kazi Mahmood, Thailand Perpetuating the Taming of Islam in Patani
(2002), available at http://www.islamonline.net/English/Views/200203/article
9.shtml.
28 See Astrid S. Tuminez, The Past Is Always the Present: The Moros of
Mindanao and the Quest for Peace, (Southeast Asia Research Ctr., Working Paper
Series
No.
99,
2008),
available
at
www.cseas.niu.edu/PhilAccess/
Tuminez_Mindanao%20Conflict.pdf.
29 J.D. Appleton et al., Mercury Contamination Associated with Artisanal
Gold mining on the Island of Mindanao, the Philippines, 228 SCI. TOTAL ENV‟T 95
(1999); William N. Holden & Daniel R. Jacobson, Ecclesial Opposition to Mining
on Mindanao: Neoliberalism Encounters the Church of the Poor in the Land of
Promise, in 11WORLDVIEWS: GLOBAL RELIGIONS, CULTURE & ECOLOGY 155 (2007),
available
at
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/
content/brill/wov;jsessionid=1bbnj97lq3c3c.alice; Salvatore Schavo-Campo & Mary
Judd, The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs and Potential Peace
Dividend (World Bank Social Development Papers, Conflict Prevention and
Reconstruction Paper No. 24, 2005).
30 Nathan Gilbert Quimpo, Options in the Pursuit of a Just, Comprehensive
and Stable Peace in the Southern Philippines, 41 ASIAN SURVEY 271 (2001).
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agreements have not been wholly successful.31 The resulting
threat to the indivisibility of the state and the lack of peace has
scared off investors, leaving the region mired in poverty.32
Thus, “internal colonialism”33 undermines the enjoyment of
“internal self-determination.”34 In such cases, conflict pre-vention
may be achieved through devising constitutional schemes to
facilitate national reconciliation by accommodating demands for
autonomy through protecting group rights and devising
decentralized forms of government which balances the needs of the
province with those of the center. Relevant factors that should
inform this task would include:
(1) Establishing a democratic political system;
(2) Training an efficient and non-corrupt bureaucracy able to
effectively devise and implement policy; and
(3) Sufficiently empowering provincial government to discharge the
tasks of government through a genuine transfer of political authority
and resources from the centre and to bring about progressive socioeconomic change to eradicate poverty.35

Poor governance, funding deficits, and a lack of broad-based
support can scuttle autonomy experiments, as in the case of
Muslim Mindanao.36 The constitutional regime established by the
1987 People‟s Constitution provides for the creation of autonomous
regimes in Muslim Mindanao (“ARMM”) “within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial

31 Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, Rethinking State Policies and Minority Rights:
Getting the Mindanao Peace Process Moving, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies
(Occasional Paper No. 2008-02, June 2008), available at http://
library.upmin.edu.ph/philmin/bangsamoro/IBS%20Occasional%20Paper%20200802%20-%20Lingga.pdf.
32 Daniel Joseph Ringuet, The Continuation of Civil Unrest and Poverty in
Mindanao, 24 CONTEMP. SE. 33 (2002).
33 M. Sornarajah, Internal Colonialism and Humanitarian Intervention, 11
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 45 (1981).
34 Internal self determination may be understood as an umbrella term
relating to minority rights and political participation rights. ANTONIO CASSESE,
SELF DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL APPRAISAL 348-55 (1995).
35 RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS
(1996); AUTONOMY AND ETHNICITY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTIETHNIC STATES (Yash P. Ghai ed., 2000).
36 SCHIAVO-CAMPO & MARY JUDD, supra note 29.

11

54

PACE INT‟L L. REV.

[Vol. 22:1

integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”37 The Constitution
also empowers the Congress of the Philippines to create organic
acts for each region which provides “for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws.”38 The ARMM
currently composes six provinces. 39
The Moro National Liberation Front (“MNLF”), one of the chief
secessionist groups, refused to recognize the ARMM.40 Under the
terms of a 1996 accord, the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao was established, as was the Southern Philippines
Council for Peace and Development, to replace the provisional
government chaired by MNLF leader, Nur Misuari.41 A splinter
MNLF group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (“MILF”), rejected
this plan and fighting resumed in 2001 after Misuari was ousted
on corruption charges.42 It is clear that economic development
plans play an important role in stabilizing states. While peace and
development efforts are currently being pursued by the Arroyo
administration, this is itself disrupted and hindered by armed
separatist struggles led by the MILF43 and Abu Sayyaff. The
MILF seeks the creation of a separate Islamic state.44 The
continuing state of instability and civil strife undoubtedly hampers
the development of the region, which is integral to the pacification
of minority concerns and the vindication of minority interests.
.
37 CONST. (1987), Art. X, (Phil.), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/
article10autonomousregions.htm.
38 Id.
39 See generally ASIAN INST. OF JOURNALISM AND COMMC‟N, WEBSITE ON
MUSLIM MINDANAO FOR JOURNALISTS AND OTHER COMMUNICATORS, History of
ARMM (2008), http://www.muslimmindanao.ph/armm.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2010).
40 THIO, supra note 23, at 333.
41 Id.
42 Li-ann Thio, International Law and Secession in the Asia and Pacific
Regions, in INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 297, 333-34 (Marcelo G. Kohen ed.,
2007).
43 Soliman M. Santos, Peacetalk: End in Sight?, MINDA NEWS, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content.&task=view
&id=5206&Itemid=266.
44 See generally ANGEL RABASA & PETER CHALK, INDONESIA‟S TRANSFORMATION
AND THE STABILITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (Rand 2001) 87 (2001), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1344/
MR1344.ch9.pdf.
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B. Transforming Constitutions to Address Ethnic Tensions in
Divided Societies45 from Integration to Autonomy
The special autonomy scheme for Aceh, constructed to operate
within the unitary framework of Indonesia, is instructive.46 In
adopting this scheme, the central government marked a shift from
a policy of repressing ethno-nationalist groups towards satisfying
their ethnic-based demands for accommodation. This required an
ideological shift from an integrationist philosophy of state which
focused on the consolidation and centralization of government
power which had, incidentally, been adopted as a unifying anticolonial strategy.
The scheme had mutated into the nonrecognition and brutal, systematic military suppression of
separatist movements, such as the Free Aceh Movement, which
was formed in the 1970s. This produced regional instability.
Indonesia began to democratize after 1998 when authoritarian
strongman, President Suharto, was removed from office. In the
face of demands for decentralization in a country with some fifty
ethnic groups, steps were taken to inject more flexibility into the
organicist47 political system to address these ethno-nationalist
demands, through regional autonomy laws.48 This espoused a
unifying Indonesian nationalism and the downplaying of cultural
45 Lijphart, supra note 11, at 99-106. Among the prescribed forms are
elections by proportional representation, parliamentary government, powersharing at cabinet level in ethnic terms, a head of state elected by parliament or
whose office is combined with the prime minister's, federalism and
decentralization, publicly funded autonomous schools.
46 Originally, the plan was for Indonesia to have a federal structure but this
was abandoned in favor of a unitary state by 1950. A fear related to a federal
structure is that it might weaken the central government and serve as a prelude
to secessionist claims.
47 This has been defined by Supomo, the main architect of the 1945
Independence Constitution as “a theory in which the state was committed not to
individual rights or particular classes but to society conceived as an organic
whole.”
Jacques
Bertrand,
Indonesia‟s
Quasi-Federalist
Approach:
Accommodation Amid Strong Integrationist Tendencies, 5 INT‟L. J. CONST. L. 576,
580 (Oct. 2007) (quoting David Bourchier, Totalitarianism and the “National
Personality”: Recent Controversy About the Philosophical Basis of the Indonesian
State, in IMAGINING INDONESIA: CULTURAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE 161
(Barbara Martin-Schiller & James William Schiller eds., 1997)). As such the
Constitution did not provide for the special representation for particular regions
or ethnic groups in enshrining the principle of the unitary state and forbidding
the designation of any subdivision as “states”.
48 REGIONALISM IN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA (Maribeth Erb et al. eds., 2005).
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differences through a common language (Malay) and the Pancasila
philosophy (five principles of state) which affirmed, nonspecifically, a “belief in (one) God”.49 This form of secular
nationalism rejected the Islamist desire to identify Islam as the
Regional resistance to the central
official state religion.50
government stems from disillusionment with the centralization of
political power, its failure to fairly distribute the gains of natural
resources exploitation, and the military repression of groups like
the Acehnese pursuant to preserving the unitary orientation of the
state.51
C. Representation of Regions in Central Government: PowerSharing
Since 1998, there have been institutional changes, reflecting a
shift from an integrationist to accommodationist approach:
“integration favours a single identity that is coterminous with the
state; accommodation on the other hand leads to flexible legal
arrangements that recognise and empower ethnic diversity in a
variety of ways.”52
Integrationists consider that stability is yielded where cultural
diversities are relegated to the private realm in institutional
terms, while in the public realm, equal citizenship rights are
recognized.53 This is individualist in orientation. Conversely,
accomodationists argue that group differences remain relatively
inflexible in many circumstances and that integration will thus
produce instability. 54 Sounder strategies lie in fostering
accommodation through pluralist federation, consociation, and
multi-cultural policies.
Commentators note the institutional changes have been “near

49 Article 29(1) of the Indonesian Constitution states: “The state shall be
based upon belief in one god.” INDON. CONST. [UUD '45] art. 29(1), available at
http://www.embassyof indonesia.org/about/pdf/IndonesianConstitution.pdf.
50 This would have alienated Christian groups from joining the nationalist
movement against the Dutch.
51 THIO, supra note 23, at 322.
52 Bertrand, supra note 47, at 580.
53 Henry J Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle for Autonomy
Regimes for Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1542 (1991).
54 Id. at 1542.
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revolutionary.”55 One of the changes included a constitutional
amendment to respect the “diversity of regions”56 and to provide for
autonomy and transfer of competences, except for matters left to
the federal government such as foreign policy, defense, security,
justice, monetary and fiscal policy, as well as religion. 57 In
addition, regions are now represented in the Regional
Representative Council, a separate legislative chamber, which is
considered primarily consultative in nature.58 Thus, regions now
have a dedicated institution in which they are represented in the
central government.
D. Special Laws for Provinces and the Institutionalization of
Autonomy: The Aceh Example – More Equitable Resource Sharing
and Control Powers; Detailed Powers of Regional Government
In relation to Aceh, the government adopted various pieces of
special legislation to effectuate this, which appears to have
produced a higher degree of stability, the latest being Law No. 11
of 2006 (with 210 articles),59 which supersedes earlier laws. The
latest legislation has been more successful as it has addressed
matters, such as fiscal issues, with greater specificity than past
laws. The July 2001 Special Autonomy Law (which has thirty-four
articles) provides that Aceh should receive 70% of the oil revenue
rather than merely 5% and 80% of the agriculture and fisheries
revenue.60 This seeks to integrate the province into national
Bertrand, supra note 47,at 592.
INDON. CONST. [UUD '45] arts. 18, 18A-B.
57 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 32 Tahun 2004 Tentang
Pemerintahan Daerah [Law No. 32, 2004 of the Republic of Indonesia on Regional
Government], arts. 1-3, 10-18.
58 Bertrand, supra note 47, at 593. Each province has the same number of
representatives, irrespective of size, and the Regional Representative Council has
the power to propose legislation to the People‟s Representative Assembly and
participate in discussing bills, as well as to oversee region-specific laws. Id.
59 MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THE FREE ACEH MOVEMENT (Aug. 15, 2005),
http://www.aceh-mm.org/download/english/Helsinki%. This emerged from the
Helsinki Memorandum of understanding signed between the Indonesian
government and the Free Aceh Movement on August 15, 2005. This specifically
allows the Free Aceh Movement combatants to disband and transform into a
political organization. Id.
60 This was not entirely satisfactory since the central government retained
the power to calculate the amounts, collect taxes and transmit revenues to the
55
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society by addressing deep-rooted grievances. In addition, the root
causes of ethnic conflict tension may be traceable to the exclusion
of Acehnese language in many public institutions, underrepresentation of Acehnese in public life and disadvantageous land
policies.
Under Law No. 11 of 2006,61 Indonesia, while not embracing a
federalist structure, has sought to stabilize its polity through
“quasi-federal forms” while preserving an overall integrationist
tone towards managing ethnic differences as well as the form of a
unitary state. This is accomplished by devolving more localized
administrative powers and increasing the percentage of fiscal
resources to be retained locally.
In addition, the central
government is under a duty to consult the province with respect to
decisions affecting the region. To remedy the vagueness in the
2001 Law, the 2006 Law sets out more clearly and in specific detail
the powers of the governor as well as a removal mechanism, those
of the Aceh legislature which have been given greater oversight
powers in relation to corruption, and the obligations of the Aceh
government to provide social services and the electoral process for
the governor and regency heads.62 Under the 2001 Law, the Aceh
police was a branch of the Indonesian National Police and the
governor only had a weak consultative role in the appointment of
police chief; under the 2006 Law, the Aceh government has
stronger oversight powers over security forces. For example, the
provinces. The 2001 Law provided that for 8 years, Aceh government would get
80% share of tax revenues from forestry, mining and fisheries with 55% oil
revenues and 40% gas revenues going to the province, After eight years, this
would be reduce to 35% oil revenues and 20% gas revenues. Bertrand, supra note
47, at 600-01.
61 Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 11 Tahun 2006 Tentang
Pemerintahan Aceh [Law No. 11, 2006 of the Republic of Indonesia on Aceh
Government], available at http://www.bra-aceh.org/download/archive/loga/
loga_law_on_the_governing_of_aceh_english_version.pdf. This can be modified by
the Indonesian Parliament, but since it specifies that the Aceh Parliament must
review and approval any Aceh-specific legislation from the Indonesian
Parliament, it opens the door to challenging national legislation in courts. An
unofficial
translation
is
available
at
www.unorc.or.id/file/
download_up.php?f=301.pdf.
62 Law No. 11/2006, arts. 223, 256 (2006) (Indon.), on the Governing of Aceh
with Explanatory Notes, translated by United States Agency for International
Development
[USAID],
available
at
http://www.braaceh.org/download/archive/loga/loga_law_on_the_governing_of_aceh_english_versi
on.pdf.
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governor and legislature must be consulted and must give their
approval to a candidate for the Aceh chief of police and the Law
requires the military to respect human rights and local customs
which is unprecedented insofar as no regional legislature has ever
had legislative power to restrict military forces.63 The Law seeks
to pacify grievances and provide some kind of accountability for
military wrongdoings by providing for a truth and reconciliation
commission to investigate past armed forces abuses.64
In addition, the 2006 Law provides an even greater share of
resources than the 2001 Law, including 70% of oil and gas
revenues from the state‟s share of income in these resources, and
80% of revenues from other provincial resources. The method of
calculating these revenues is more specific, in order to mitigate
manipulation and deal with past perceptions that the central
government was retaining more than its fair share of total
revenues.65 In addition, the Aceh government now enjoys the
authority to administer all natural resources, which is “an
unprecedented delegation of powers over revenues.”66
The province of Aceh has been awarded two significant special
exceptions from the general law of the land. First, local political
parties have the right to organize, and do not need to have a
national outlook as is required elsewhere in Indonesia.67 Second, as
a special concession to Aceh, religion falls within its provincial
jurisdiction, whereas it is a matter falling within the jurisdiction of
the central government for the rest of the country.68
These legal developments have given Aceh province a clearer
legal basis for implementing Islamic law in a comprehensive
manner,69 although the central government retains some measure
Id. arts. 202-03, at 83.
Bertrand, supra note 47, at 603.
65 Id. at 602.
66 Id.
67 Ben Hillman, Bullets to Ballots: Aceh in 2009, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 4,
2009,
http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/december51/bullets-to-ballots-aceh-in2009; Irwandi Yusuf, Elections Must be Peaceful in Aceh, JAKARTA POST, Feb. 21
2009, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/21/elections-must-be-peacefulaceh.html .
68 Katie Hamann, Aceh Province Legislators Vote to Impose Stricter Sharia
Law, VOANEWS.COM, Sept. 15, 2009, http://www1.voanews.com/ english/news/a13-2009-09-15-voa9-68709782.html.
69 This includes implementing the law relating to human relationships which
may address the sale and purchase of goods, banking, borrowing money,
63
64
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of control, for example, by appointing religious court Justices.70
Aside from according broader competence to the Islamic courts of
justice, the new institution of the Wilayatul Hisbah (syariah police)
has been established; it is tasked with overseeing Islamic
regulations on dress, alcohol, gambling, and “immoral acts,” but
has no powers of arrest.71 There have been concerns that Aceh is a
“pilot project” for those who wish Indonesia to jettison its secular
foundations and replace it with an Islamic state, which would be
oppressive to non-Muslims as well as moderate Muslims.72
It appears that the recalibration of center-periphery powers
through autonomy laws, which qualifies the integrationist
approach, has eased tensions between the provinces and the
central government. However, its longevity remains to be seen.
E. Privileged Treatment and the Problems of Perpetuation –
Bumiputera Policy
A cautionary tale may be gleaned from the Malaysian context,
where the legal system is based on the Westminster model of
parliamentary government.73
The Federal Constitution of
Malaysia, adopted in 1957 after a period of Anglo-Malayan
negotiations, constitutionalized economic and other privileges for
the majority Malays and other indigenous groups falling with the
category of “bumiputera” (sons of the soil).74 This provision was
mortgages, mining, establishment of companies, regulating human labour: Under
Article 39 of Qanun No. 10/2002, the Islamic courts of justice can decide such
related matters beyond personal and family law.
70 Hasnil Basri Siregar, Islamic Law in a National Legal System: A Study on
the Implementation of Shari‟ah in Aceh, 3 ASIAN J. COMP. L., art. 4 (2008),
available at http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol3/iss1/art4/.
71 There have been clashes with the secular security forces, e.g., over a dance
at a cultural event which the syariah police considered “did not reflect the Islamic
atmosphere and should be stopped instantly”: Aceh Forces Clash over Dance,
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 9, 2008, at C5.
72 Ana Gomes, Op-Ed. & Comment., Aceh‟s Harsh Islamic Law is an Ominous
Sign-Int‟l Herald Trib., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2006, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/13/opinion/edgomes.php.
73 Deborah A Johnson & Anthony Milner, 'Westminster Implanted: The
Malaysian Experience', in WESTMINSTER LEGACIES: DEMOCRACY AND
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Haig Patapan et al. eds.,
2005).
74 Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, Malay Nationalism, Islamic Supremacy and the
Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of Malaysia, 13 INT'L J. ON
MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 95 (2006).
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designed to assuage fears of the Malays who constitute some 54%
of the population75 in relation to the economic dominance of the
Chinese minority community.
Former Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, in speaking of the
Malaysian power-sharing model, described the priority in the postIndependence era when Malaysia was “an ethnic time bomb
waiting to explode,” of implementing an inclusive approach, which
empowered all ethnic and religious groups by giving them a
collective stake in decision-making. Part of this social contract,
enshrined within the Constitution, was:
[T]he agreement by the indigenous peoples to grant citizenship to
the immigrant Chinese and Indian communities. This changed the
character of the nation, from one that originally belonged to the
indigenous peoples to one that Chinese and Indian citizens could
also call their own. Chinese and Indians now share political power
with the Malays and sit in the Federal Cabinet and State
Executive Councils. In return for being granted these political
rights, the immigrant communities agreed to special economic
privileges for the indigenous peoples, given their disadvantaged
position. This constitutes the political, economic, legal and moral
foundation for the distributive justice policies of the country. 76

In addition, Malay was constitutionally recognized as the
national language, and Islam as the official religion of the
Federation. Under Article 153(1) of the Federal Constitution of
Malaysia,77 the head of state or Yang di Pertuan Agong (King) is
obliged to “safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives
of any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak and the legitimate

See generally JOSHUA CASTELLINO & ELVIRA DOMÍNGUEZ REDONDO,
MINORITY RIGHTS IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS ch. 4 (2006). Chinese
represent about 25% of the population, Indians about 8%, and indigenous groups
about 12 percent. Id.
76 H.E. Dato' Seri Abdullah Haji Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister Malay.,
Keynote Address at Asia Media Summit: The Challenges of Multireligious,
Multiethnic and Multicultural Societies, ¶¶ 20-21 (Apr. 19, 2004), available at
http://www.un.int/malaysia/PM%20Statement/PM041904.htm.
77 MALAY. CONST. art. 153(1). These special privileges were a continuation of
those enjoyed by the Malays, which the British had recognized in treaties they
entered into with Malay sultans. Thus, this created in the Malay mind a sense
that Malaysia belongs to Malays and the privileges were their entitlement by
birthright.
75
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interests of other communities . . . .”78 Pursuant to this, special
provisions may include reserving public service positions,
scholarships, educational and training privileges, and licenses for
trade and business, as required by federal law for Malays and
natives of Sabah and Sarawak.79
It is true that economic disparity between the wealthy Chinese
minority and the Malay majority is a cause of social tension. The
effect of this regime of privileged treatment, however, is that it is
both under and over-inclusive, given its avowed purpose of
equalizing or minimizing social-economic disparities.80 Starkly
put, it is because such privileged treatment excludes poor Chinese
and rich Malays. A more holistic policy of distributive justice
would be means-oriented rather than race-oriented. In addition,
this affirmative action program for the majority has bred a
dependency or entitlement mentality amongst the privileged
communities.81 Article 153 has been invoked to support Ketuanan
Melayu, the Malay supremacy nationalist belief that the Malays
are the lords of Malaysia, as opposed to a non-racist conception of a
78 Malaysia has an ethnically plural composition: Malays account for 54.1%
and other Bumiputeras account for 11.8% of the total population; the Chinese
account for 25.3% of the population and the Indians, 7.7%. SAW SWEE-HOCK, THE
POPULATION OF MALAYSIA 71 (2007).
79 MALAY. CONST. art. 161A(6)-(7). “Natives” are defined in article 161A as
meaning (a) in relation to Sarawak, a person who is a citizen and either belongs to
one of the races specified in Clause (7) as indigenous to the State or is of mixed
blood deriving exclusively from those races; and (b) in relation to Sabah, a person
who is a citizen, is the child or grandchild of a person of a race indigenous to
Sabah, and was born (whether on or after Malaysia Day or not) either in Sabah or
to a father domiciled in Sabah at the time of the birth. Clause (7) provides that
the races to be treated for the purposes of the definition of "native" in Clause (6)
as indigenous to Sarawak are the Bukitans, Bisayahs, Dusuns, Sea Dayaks, Land
Dayaks, Kadayans, Kalabit, Kayans, Kenyags (Including Sabups and Sipengs),
Kajangs (including Sekapans,. Kejamans, Lahanans, Punans, Tanjongs dan
Kanowits), Lugats, Lisums, Malays, Melanos, Muruts, Penans, Sians, Tagals,
Tabuns and Ukits. Notably, this definition excludes indigenous people such as
the Orang Asli on Peninsula Malaysia. Id.
80 Huang Thio Su Mien, Constitutional Discrimination Under the Malaysian
Constitution, 6 MALAY. L. REV. 1 (1964).
81 M. BAKRI MUSA, THE MALAY DILEMMA REVISITED - RACE DYNAMICS IN
MODERN MALAYSIA (1999); THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AROUND THE
WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 55-77 (2004); Nazry Bahwari, Will Malaysia Ever be
GUARDIAN.CO.UK
(Malay.),
Nov.
16,
2009,
Colour-Blind?,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/16/malaysia-race/print; PETER
WOOD, CLIENTAGE AND CONTUMELY: HOW GROUP PREFERENCES FOSTER
DEPENDENCY AND RESENTMENT 275, 275-87 (2008).
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Malaysian Malaysia. Although Article 153 was drafted as a
temporary provision,82 it is today seditious to discuss its repeal and
the special rights of Malays in all political, social and economic
spheres.83 Critics further argue that government policy such as the
National Economic Policy (“NEP”) is constitutionally ultra vires.84
The NEP sought to correct economic imbalance and eradicate
Some measures pursuant to this involved giving
poverty.85
bumiputera real estate at discounts of 5% to 15% and adopting
regulations setting a minimum equity holding for bumiputera.86 It
set the target of transferring 30% of the nation‟s wealth to Malays
by 1990.87
The NEP has apparently created a Malay middle class which
its supporters argue has averted social conflicts and a return to the
racial riots of the past.88 Indeed, Malay politicians have been
known to say that if minorities were unhappy with the status quo,
they could return to India or China; one even declared that if
Malay privileges were taken away, there would be „„blood flowing
in the streets.”89
Critics allege that the unfortunate side-effects90 of the policy
include corruption in the award of government contracts and open
The Reid Commission, which drafted the Merdeka Constitution, agreed
that the privileges should continue for some fifteen to twenty years unless
Parliament provided otherwise. The Alliance parties, including the governing
UMNO party, agreed for a review of the position fifteen years after Independence
in an oral communication which was omitted from the Alliance memorandum for
reasons of political sensitivity. See JOSEPH M. FERNANDO, MONOGRAPH NO. 31, THE
MAKING OF THE MALAYAN CONSTITUTION 85-86 (2002).
83 Pub. Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik, [1971] 2 M.L.J. 108 (Malay.); Fan Yew
Teng v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1975] 2 M.L.J. 235 (Malay.).
84 Mohammad Rizal Salim & Zalina Abdul Halim, The Boundaries of Law: A
Socio-Legal Perspective of Malaysia's Economic Policy, 8 GLOBAL JURIST ADVANCES
1 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol8/ iss2/art7.
85 Id.
86 Id.; see also R Rasiah & I Shari, Market, Government and Malaysia's New
Economic Policy, 25 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 57-78 (2001).
87 Ho Khai Leong, Dynamics of Policy-Making in Malaysia: The Formulation
of the New Economic Policy and the National Development Policy, 14 ASIAN J. PUB.
ADMIN. 204-227 (1992), available at sunzi1. lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/50/5000368.pdf.
88 See Rizal Salim & Abdul Halim, supra note 84.
89 James Chin, Malaysia‟s Broad Mix Still Waiting to Merge Happily,
CANBERRA TIMES, July 11, 2008, available at http://www.canberratimes.com.
au/news/opinion/editorial/general/malaysias-broad-mix-still-waiting-to-mergehappily/809296.
90 Id.
82
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racial discrimination in university intake and civil service jobs.91
This has polarized Malays and non-Malays and caused resentment
and a sense of being treated as second class citizens, compounded
by the excessive emphasis on the Malay language and culture in
the public school system.92 Indeed, the idea was that affirmative
action was meant to be temporary until Malays were economically
on par with non-Malays.93 The creation of a class of Malays overreliant on government subsidies thwarts efforts to develop a united
nation and perpetuates a simmering source of ethnic tension fueled
by Malay nationalism and non-Malay grievances.94 While the NEP
was designed ultimately to promote national unity by reducing
income disparity between the races, its racist orientation does not
help bridge any ethnic divide. In particular, the bumiputera
varsity quota remains a major source of resentment nursed by the
Chinese against Malays.95
This resentment translated into a loss of political support. In
turn, the loss of political support manifested in the outcome of the
2008 Malaysian General elections, where the ruling Barisan
Nasional (“BN”) coalition, which had been in power for fifty-one
years, suffered its worst post-Independence losses and lost its twothirds majority in parliament and several states.96 Prime Minister
Badawi, whose policies were blamed for the decline in BN‟s
political fortunes, resigned and handed the reins of power to Prime
Minister Razak Najib in April 2009.97 In seeking to recapture the
support of the disaffected Indian and Chinese minority groups, Mr.
Najib has been speaking of the need to unite Malaysia‟s many

91 Article 136 of the Federal Constitution requires that civil servants be
treated impartially regardless of race. MALAY. CONST. art. 136.
92 Graham K Brown, Making Ethnic Citizens: The Politics and Practice of
Education in Malaysia, 27 INT‟L J. EDUC. DEV. 318, 318-30 (2007).
93 Rizal Salim & Abdul Halim, supra note 84, at 1-30.
94 Malay political leaders have also criticized the Malays for being lazy,
ungrateful and over-reliant on bumiputera benefits. See generally DR. MAHATHIR
MOHAMAD, MALAYS FORGET EASILY (2001).
95 Thomas Fuller, Malaysia to End Quotas That Favor Ethnic Malays, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2009, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/07/01/world/asia/01malaysia.html.
96 Abdul Rashid Moten, 2004 and 2008 General Elections in Malaysia:
Towards a Multicultural, Bi-party Political System?, 17 ASIAN J. POL. SCI. 173,
173-94 (2009).
97 Najib Appointed New Malaysian PM, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7980554.stm.
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racial groups and of appreciating their contribution to Malaysia.98
One of the recent reversals in policies include ending the
bumiputera quota for the services sector in an attempt to improve
Malaysia‟s international competitiveness in the global economy.99
It seems that national considerations can trump communal
considerations.
III. MINORITIES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
A general observation about institutional design is that in
heterogeneous societies with deep ethnic and religious divisions, it
is not advisable to have a purely majoritarian system, which
usually entails the indefinite exclusion from power of a minority
group, placing it in a position of permanent political nondominance and potentially without an outlet to air their
grievances. The more pure a parliamentary system is, the closer it
approximates the majoritarian model. Unitary systems generally
work best with homogenous populations.100
Institutional means must be found to include these minority
groups in the process not only of constitutional government, but
also of constitution-making. A shift from a majoritarian to a more
consensual model of decision-making is reflected in the greater
attention paid to deliberative processes with multiple entry points,
to ensure that the legislative process takes into account nonmajoritarian concerns. So structured, institutions can produce
more consensualist politics.

“We must reach out to all parts of Malaysia - to all our diverse
communities. In our national discourse and in pursuing our national agenda, we
must never leave anyone behind. We must reach out to the many who may have
been disaffected and left confused by political games, deceit and showmanship."
PM Najib's Maiden Speech: „One Malaysia. People First. Performance Now,‟ STAR
ONLINE
(Malay.),
Apr.
3
2009,
available
at
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2009/4/3/nation/20090403201619&sec=
nation. See also Choi Tuck Wo, Najib: 1Malaysia a Concept for the World' STAR
ONLINE
(Malay.),
Oct.
7,
2009,
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.
asp?file=/2009/10/7/nation/4854896&sec=nation. The 1Malaysia website is at
http://www.1malaysia.com.my/.
99 Adib Zalkapli, Najib Drops Bumiputera Quota for Services Sector, MALAY.
INSIDER,
Apr.
22,
2009,
http://www.themalaysianinsider.com.my/
index.php/malaysia/24151-najib-drops-bumiputera-quota-for-services-sector.
100 See generally YASH GHAI, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND MINORITIES (2003).
98
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A. Making Constitutions
As an example of consensualist politics, a ninety-nine member
Constitution Drafting Assembly was put in charge101 to draft the
exemplary 1997 Thai Constitution (now superseded by the 2007
draft produced after the September 2006 bloodless military
coup).102 The process of composing the Assembly is instructive.
The People got their say through an electoral process by which
members were chosen from provinces, a total of seventy-six
members, one for each province. The remainder consisted of
twenty-three members chosen from lawyers, political scientists,
politicians and civil servants.
The key principle is that
representatives should be chosen on an inclusive basis, to ensure
that the final product is not dominated or hijacked by any one
particular group (particularly bureaucrats, technocrats or the
military).103
B. Electoral Systems
In terms of electoral systems, some of the best practices
include designing a system to include members of different groups
within the same unit or legislative body. Ensuring that minorities
have a voice in policy-making to express their concerns through
guaranteeing legislative representation is an important
consideration in ordering a Constitution. This can be accomplished
through various methods, but it is crucial to also secure political
freedoms of speech, assembly and association. This is necessary
for a vibrant multi-party system where political groups are able to
form and to campaign for support.

101 James R Klein, The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A
Blueprint for Participatory Democracy 9-14 (Asia Found. Series, Working Paper
No. 8, 1998), available at http://asiafoundation.org/pdf/wp8.pdf. See Andrew
Harding, May There be Virtue: New Asian Constitutionalism in Thailand, 3
AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 24 (2001).
102 Erik Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand's 1997 "People's
Constitution": Be Careful What You Wish for, 48 ASIAN SURV. 373, 373-92 (2008);
see also Bjorn Dressel, Thailand's Elusive Quest for a Workable Constitution,
1997-2007, 31 CONTEMP. SE. ASIA J. INT‟L & STRAT. AFF. 296 (2009).
103 See Harding, supra note 101.
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C. Ethnic Politics and Multi-Ethnic Coalition Government
In Malaysia, ethnic politics have not been legally barred
within its multi-ethnic society; instead, it is “allow[ed] . . .
Malaysia practices a form of
responsible expression.”104
parliamentary government based on the Westminster model and
the principle of simple plurality (first past the post), and the oneman, one-vote model.105
In practice, this has produced multi-ethnic coalition
government among political parties which are ethnically and
racially based. For example, the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition,
which has governed Malaysia since Independence in 1957, is
dominated by UMNO (Malays), MCA (Chinese), and MIA
(Indians).106 Within a multi-ethnic coalition, ethnic and regionbased interests are moderated.107
D. Proportional Representation
Alternatives to a purely majoritarian system include
proportional representation systems or intermediate systems, such
as those which are generally majoritarian but offer guaranteed
representation to particular minorities. While the proportional
representation system produces proportionality and minority
representation (the percentage of votes a group receives translates
into a similar percentage of legislative seats), Singapore has
always rejected this approach for fear it would produce communal
politicking and a weak coalition government contrary to the
Badawi, supra note 76, ¶ 24.
TOMMY THOMAS, THE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 152-62 (Graham Hassall & Cheryl Saunders eds., 1997).
106 DIANE K. MAUZY, BARISAN NASIONAL: COALITION GOVERNMENT IN MALAYSIA
(1st ed. 1983).
107 Ethnic relations have always been the leitmotif of Malaysian politics since
the Country's independence in 1957. The government has been a coalition of
ethnic-based political parties. The Alliance, which ruled the country from 1957 to
1972, was a coalition of political parties composed of the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). After 1972, the Alliance was broadened to
include several smaller parties and was renamed the National Front (Barisan
Nasional). The dominant political party in the coalition is undoubtedly the
UMNO. See generally Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo, Malay Nationalism, Islamic
Supremacy and the Constitutional Bargain in the Multi-ethnic Composition of
Malaysia, 13 INT‟L J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 95 (2006).
104
105
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objectives of a developmentalist state.108
E. Institutionalizing Multi-Racial Politics: The Group
Representation Constituency and Minority Legislative
Representation
Singapore practices a system of parliamentary democracy
whereby the will of the people is broadly the basis of the authority
of government, with the Singapore government asserting that it is
accountable through periodic secret free elections. This is based on
the Westminster model of parliamentary government, the elements
of which include:
(1) A unicameral or bicameral chamber whose members are
freely elected by universal adult suffrage;
(2) From one of more political parties;
(3) Executive power vested in a head of state but primarily
exercised by cabinet government headed by a prime minister as
head of government;
(4) The head of government is chosen from the political party
commanding the support of the legislative majority and
answerable to that elective chamber;
(5) A recognized opposition; and
(6) A set of constitutional conventions. 109

In 1988, Singapore altered its one-man one-vote electoral
system based on single member wards by introducing the Group
Representation Constituency (“GRC”), where multi-member teams
contest an electoral ward.110 The original rationale of the GRC
Indeed, the prevailing philosophy in the early days of independence was
assimilationist in assuming that the interests of minority communities are best
secured by protecting the equal rights of all citizens, regardless of race or religion.
Statement of S. Rajaretnam, Minister for Foreign Affairs, SING. PARL. DEB. vol.
25, cols. 1353-1372 (Mar. 16, 1967). See generally JACLYN LING-CHIEN, THE
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND THE CONSTITUTION: A JUDICIOUS BALANCE, in
EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: FORTY YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 23459 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin Y. L. Tan eds., 2009) (discussing Singapore's minority's
protection under its constitution).
109 Modified from William Dale, The Making and Remaking of Commonwealth
Constitutions, 42 INT‟L & COMP. L. Q. 67, 72-73 (1993).
110 Li-ann Thio, The Right to Political Participation in Singapore: TailorMaking a Westminster-Modelled Constitution to fit the Imperatives of „Asian‟
108
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scheme was to promote political stability by institutionalizing
multi-racialism in the composition of Parliament.111 Each GRC
team must field a candidate from a stipulated minority group.112 A
nominal number of eight single member constituencies (“SMCs”)
were retained.113 The ostensible purpose of the scheme was to
guarantee minority representation in Parliament. However, the
reasons given for the subsequent enlargement of GRC team sizes
from three-member teams to teams ranging from four to six
members was unrelated to the original objective of guaranteeing
minority representation; instead, these amendments were
designed to serve the unrelated purposes of facilitating the
operation of town councils and community development councils,
which are forms of local governance.114
After the 1984 elections, the ruling People‟s Action Party
(“PAP”) expressed the fear that younger voters preferred
candidates best suited to serve their own needs, disregarding the
importance of returning “a racially balanced party slate of
candidates.”115 Thus, a corrective measure to ensure that majority
rule did not eventuate in the neglect of minority interests was
introduced in the form of the GRC, which is basically a megaconstituency created by the merging together of three former
SMCs.116 It is contested on the basis of teams of four to six
candidates. In assembling multi-racial teams, political parties
would have to enter into inter-ethnic party alliances which would
moderate racial politics. In effect, the PAP government was
institutionalizing its own political practice of fielding a slate of
multi-racial candidates and thereby requiring other political
Democracy, 6 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, 216-19 (2002).
111 Id.
112 SING. CONST. art. 39A(2), available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/.
113 SING. CONST. art. 39A; Parliamentary Elections Act, ch. 218, § 8A(1)(a)
(Sing.).
114 For a critique of the GRC scheme in hindering political pluralism (the
political opposition has never won a GRC ward since its inception in 1988 and
critics argue that the GRC scheme serves to perpetuate the hegemony of the
People‟s Action Party which has been in power since independence in 1965), see
THIO, supra note 110, at 181-243.
115 The racial composition of Singapore is approximately 77.7% Chinese, 14.1%
Malay, 7.1% Indians and 1.1% „Other‟ races. See Andreas Ackermann, They Give
Us the Categories and We Fill Ourselves in: Ethnic Thinking in Singapore, 4 INT‟L
J. ON MINORITY & GROUP RTS. 451 (1997).
116 Thio, supra note 110, at 216-19.

27

70

PACE INT‟L L. REV.

[Vol. 22:1

parties, some of which were ethnic-based, to practice multi-ethnic
politics.117 Notably, the Constitution itself does not stipulate a
minority quota and only provides that a minority candidate be
fielded in each GRC.118 An increase in the size and numbers of
GRCs might entail a corresponding quantitative decline in
minority representation.
F. Legislative Oversight?
The government has also created constitutional institutions to
supervise legislation and protect minority groups against
discrimination, The Singapore Government, for example, adopted
the proposal of the 1966 constitutional commission for a multiracial watchdog body called the Council of State, designed to
scrutinize potentially discriminatory legislation.119 This quasi
Second Chamber was later renamed the Presidential Council on
Minority Rights (“PCMR”), tasked with reviewing legislation which
had “differentiating measures.”120 This was defined in Article 68
as measures which in their practical application would be
“disadvantageous to persons of any racial or religious community.”
Its members include the Chief Justice, Prime Minister (PM), senior
Cabinet members, and the Attorney General.
Law Minister EW Barker traced its origins to the 1958
Kenyan constitution.121 Upon independence, Kenya removed this
institution for fear it would perpetuate racial discrimination and
undermine ministerial responsibility.122 Nevertheless, Barker
considered this “a promising innovation” in Singapore to ensure
harmonious social relations; being advisory in nature, it could not
117 Li-ann Thio, The Passage of a Generation: Revising the 1966 Constitutional
Commission, in THE EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: 40 YEARS OF THE SINGAPORE
CONSTITUTION 7-49, 40 (Li-ann Thio & Kevin YL Tan eds., 2008).
118 SING. CONST. art. 39A(2).
119 Thio, supra note 117, at 60.
120 SING. CONST. art. 68.
121 Conversely, Gerald de Cruz argued that its historical origins were “entirely
local”, stemming from the proposal for a Council of Races to scrutinize laws to
prevent discrimination on the grounds of race, religion and sex in the proposed
People‟s Constitution for Malaya (including Singapore) put forward in 1947 by
Pan-Malayan Council of Joint Action and Pusat Tenaga Raayat that appeared in
STRAITS TIMES, May 28, 1969. Gerald de Cruz, The Presidential Council, 1 SING. L.
REV. 20, 20-25 (1969).
122 Thio, supra note 119, at 18.
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significantly impede the legislative agenda, leaving “the legislative
primacy of Parliament unaffected.”123 This was favored over
proposals to have a Committee of minority representatives chosen
directly by minority groups to represent minorities in the elected
chamber of Parliament or to elect or nominate minorities to sit in
an Upper House.124 The desire to not allow minorities to directly
elect minority representatives has remained a consistent feature of
PAP policy, fearing that it would spark communalism and
destabilize society.
The deficiencies of the PCMR as a mechanism of legislative
oversight have been well documented.125 All PCMR proceedings
are held in camera.126 Article 87 provides that “any Minister,
Minister of State or Parliamentary Secretary specially authorized
by the Prime Minister” may attend these private meetings.127 The
lack of publicity diminishes its potential role as a watchdog against
racial discrimination. Furthermore, it is hampered in its task to
protect minority rights and obstruct the passage of discriminatory
legislation which might impair communal harmony. This is
because the PCMR only receives legislative bills after the third
reading, rather than during second reading where it could more
effectively highlight controversial provisions to parliamentarians
and conceivably have some input in the substantive content of the
bill, before its enacted. 128 If the PCMR received the bill and could
render its report, whether adverse or otherwise, before the second
reading, parliamentarians could have the benefit of its analysis
before debating the bill.
Even when the PCMR finds a “differentiating measure” in a
bill, it has limited powers. The PCMR may make an adverse
report to the Speaker who will present the bill to Parliament for
123 Law Minister Edmund William Barker, 25 Sing. Parl. Rep., col. 1389, at
1431-32 (Mar. 17, 1967).
124 REP. CONST. COMM., at 13, para. 46 (1966) (Sing.).
125 See Thio Su Mien, The Presidential Council, 1 SING. L. REV. 2 (1969); David
Marshall, The Presidential Council, 1 SING. L. REV. 9 (1969).
126 Li-ann
Thio,The Passage of a Generation: Revisiting the 1996
Constitutional Commission, in THE EVOLUTION OF A REVOLUTION: 40 YEARS OF THE
SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION 7-49, 44(Li-ann Thio & Kevin YL Tan eds., 2009).
127 SING. CONST. art. 84.
128 Article 78(1) of the Singapore Constitution only obliges the Speaker to
present an authentic copy of the bill to the PCMR after its third and final stage,
prior to the presentment for presidential assent, after the conclusion of
parliamentary deliberations. SING. CONST. art. 78(1).
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amendment. A check exists insofar as Article 78(6)(a) provides
that such a bill cannot be presented to the President for assent
unless the Speaker certifying it is free of „differentiating
measures.‟129 However, a two-thirds parliamentary majority can
easily circumvent this under the Article 78(6)(c) procedure by
endorsing a motion to present the bill to the President
notwithstanding an adverse report. The cabinet‟s ability to muster
this parliamentary majority is a given, as the current government
overwhelmingly controls eighty-two of eighty-four elected
parliamentary seats in a dominant one party state. The only
“check” is the resultant publicity the overriding of an adverse
report may elicit. However, no adverse report has ever been made.
Any legislative oversight body must have sufficiently strong
powers to constitute a real check against discriminatory
legislation; the public should have access to it to facilitate focused
citizen participation in policy-making, and such body should have
the opportunity to contribute to the process of legislative scrutiny,
rather than exist merely as a cosmetic body or psychological
comforter. Weak and ineffectual institutions are unlikely to
alleviate minority fears of majority abuse. To effectively protect
minorities, institutions should be constructed to ensure effective
modes of accountability, transparency and participation.
IV. SOCIAL-CULTURAL DIMENSION OF MINORITIES ISSUES –
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND TRIBAL LOYALTY
Nationalism can be fostered through symbols and myths or
even through enshrining an official religion in the Constitution,
though this can be very divisive in a multi-religious, multi-ethnic
setting.130
The call to accord constitutional status to a religion indicates
the importance of religion as a source of legitimacy and as an
influential component of the worldview of religious believers.
129 SING. CONST. art. 68 (defines “differentiating measure" as “any measure
which is, or is likely in its practical application to be, disadvantageous to persons
of any racial or religious community and not equally disadvantageous to persons
of other such communities, either directly by prejudicing persons of that
community or indirectly by giving advantage to persons of another community.”).
130 See, e.g., Mark Juergensmeyer, The Debate over Hindutva, 26 RELIGION 129
(1996); BRENDA COSSMAN & RATNA KAPUR, SECULARISM'S LAST SIGH?: HINDUTVA
AND THE (MIS) RULE OF LAW (2002).
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However, it also reveals a clash of competing constitutional
paradigms in terms of how to organize law, society, and the
individual. In South-East Asia, Islamic revivalism has fueled calls
for a legal system based on Islamic law, which clashed with
common law systems after the American model (Philippines),
hybridized by Spanish civilian influences, or the British model
(Malaysia). As Harding noted: “[T]he failure of Islamic law to
attain the status of global doctrine in maritime South East Asia
probably represents the largest single remaining grievance in
connection with the imposition of colonial law.”131 With the
introduction of colonial rule and the principle of secular
government with some limited accommodation of minority religion,
legal pluralism has confined the operation of Islamic law to a
narrow range of matters pertaining to personal, customary, and
family law.132
Secularism itself as a constitutional principle is a useful
ordering device for state-religion relations insofar as it does not
adopt the form of a substantive, anti-theistic ideology which is
hostile towards religious belief.133 Rather than descend into a form
of secular fundamentalism, the principle of secularity operates as a
framework under which disparate religious groups may peacefully
co-exist. This requires that religious (and non religious) groups are
treated equally under the law, that is, the state is to adopt a
neutral posture towards religious groups.
However, a resurgence of religiosity and its demands to enter
into the public realm challenges the secular framework. This could
be in the form of demanding the implementation of religious law,
such as the Islamic syariah, pursuant to establishing an Islamic
state where religion and politics are unified, not separated.
Alternatively, where there are calls to recognize an official state

Andrew Harding, Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East
Asia, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 35, 40 (2002).
132 Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law
Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 543-80 (1994).
133 See, e.g., András Sajó, Preliminaries to a Concept of Constitutional
Secularism, 6 INT'L J. CONST . L. 605, 605-29 (2008); John Finnis, On the Practical
Meaning of Secularism, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491 (1998); Ian T. Benson, Notes
Towards a (Re) Definition of the “Secular”, 33 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 519, 519-49
(2000); William M. McClay, Two Concepts of Secularism, 13 J. OF POL‟Y HIST. 47
(2001); T.N. Madan, Secularism in Its Place, 46 J. ASIAN STUD. 759 (1987); Paul F.
Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1814 (1994).
131
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religion, which would privilege it, sparking off tension with
religious minorities. This is because in such situations, the state
has been called upon not to serve as neutral arbiter between
competing religious claims, but to afford preferential treatment to
the religious beliefs and practices of a resurgent religious group.
A. Malaysia: Judicial Revisionist of the Constitutional PreCommitment to Promote Malay/Islamic Supremacy and the Threat
to Human Rights
The Singapore and Malaysian approach towards the scope of
religious liberty differs starkly, although the Article 15 religious
guarantee clause under the Singapore Constitution derives from
Article 11 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.134 Singapore
seceded from the federation in 1965 and embarked upon its own
distinctive approach towards securing religious liberty in a multireligious setting.135
The very notion of “accommodative secularism”136 in the
Singapore context relates to the Constitution‟s guarantee of
religious freedom being premised on “removing restrictions to one‟s
choice of religious belief,” as the state is agnostic about religious
truth claims. However, Article 11 of the Malaysian Constitution is
construed more strictly; it provides that “[e]very person has the
right to profess and practice his religion and, subject to Clause (4),
to propagate it.”137 The Singapore version excludes reference to
state legislative power to enact anti-propagation laws.
The more restrictive Malaysian approach has been most
apparent in apostasy cases, which have stirred both racial and
134 MALAY.
CONST . art.11, available at http://confinder.richmond.edu/
admin/docs/malaysia.pdf.
135 Li-ann Thio, Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious
Harmony in Singapore's Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State, 33 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 197 (2006). The religious breakdown of the Singapore population has been
reported as follows: Buddhists & Taoists (51%); Muslims (15%); Christians (15%);
Hindus (4%); No Religion (13%) and Other Religions (2%). DAVID CHAN, ATTITUDE
ON RACE AND RELIGION: SURVEY ON SOCIAL ATTITUDES OF SINGAPOREANS (SAS) 2001
(2002), available at http://www.mcys.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/download/MCDS-RR.pdf.
136 Nappalli Peter Williams v. Inst. of Technical Educ., [1999] 2 S.L.R. 569,
576 ¶ 29 (Sing. Ct. App. 1999).
137 Clause 4 reads: “State law and in respect of the Federal Territories of
Kuala Lumpur and Lubuan, federal law may control or restrict the propagation of
any religious doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.”
MALAY . CONST . art. 11.
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religious tensions. This has arisen in relation to the so-called “body
snatcher” cases, where a deceased Hindu who had apparently
converted to Islam without his wife‟s knowledge, had his body
appropriated by the state Islamic agency for Muslim burial,
contrary to the wishes of the wife who insisted he was Hindu.138
Although the civil courts have declined to hear apostasy cases
asserting a lack of jurisdiction on dubious grounds, given the
involvement of a constitutional issue, certain High Court Justices,
unable to separate their religious affiliations from their official
duties, have nonetheless proffered attenuated readings of the scope
of religious freedom.139
Contrary to international human rights standards, the right to
“profess” a religion has been restrictively construed to exclude a
right to free conscience, including the “freedom to change . . .
religion.”140 In Daud bin Mamat v. Majlis Agama Islam, the High
Court Justice held that exiting a religion “is certainly not a
religion” and, in the absence of an express right to renounce
religion, to infer that Article 11(1) protected this “would stretch the
scope of [Article] 11(1) of the Federal Constitution to ridiculous
heights, and rebel against the canon of construction.”141 Apostasy
or religious conversions are a particularly sensitive issue within
the Muslim community in Malaysia, although there are divergent
opinions as to whether the law should punish apostates or whether
this should be a matter for the afterlife as “there is no compulsion
in Islam.”142 In the notorious case of Lina Joy,143 which involved a
Malay Muslim woman who had converted to Christianity and
138 Devinder Singh, Moorthy Buried as a Muslim, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.),
Dec. 12, 2005, at 4.
139 Id. at 197-226.
140 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 18, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
141 Id.
142 E.g., verse 2:256 of the Quran. See generally Abdullahi An-Niam, Human
Rights in the Muslim World 3 H ARV . H UM. RTS . J. 13 (1990).
143 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain, [2007]
4 M.L.J. 585, aff'g Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah & Anor, [2004] 2
M.L.J. 119 (Malay.). See also Li-ann Thio, Apostasy and Religious Freedom:
Constitutional Issues Arising from the Lina Joy Litigation, 2 MALAY. L.J. 1 (2006).
For a discussion of the Federal Court decision (which did not introduce any
substantially new argument not already canvassed at the lower judicial levels),
see Joshua Neoh, Islamic State and the Common Law in Malaysia: A Case Study
of
Lina
Joy,
GLOBAL
JURIST
8.2
(2008),
available
at
http://works.bepress.com/joshua_neoh/.
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unsuccessfully sought to have this reflected through changing her
name and religion on her identity card, the High Court Justice
raised a “public order”144 argument as a limitation on Article 11(1).
Justice Faiza Thamby Chik stated that if Muslims were allowed to
convert out of Islam at will, this would affect Article 11, Sections
(4) and (5), which served to protect harmony and safeguard the
“interests of Muslims and non-Muslims.”145
Thus, rather than free agency, a Muslim‟s personal choice to
change religious affiliation implicated public order, contrary to
Minister for Home Affairs Malaysia v. Jamaluddin bin Othman,
which the Justice did not discuss, despite its relevance.146 The
Supreme Court quashed an Internal Security Act preventive
detention order issued against Jamaluddin, a Malay Christian
convert who was involved in a program to propagate Christianity
among Malays, apparently converting six Malays to
Christianity.147 Rejecting the argument that such activities could
create tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities,
the Court found no security threat under the terms of the Act. 148
Article 11 could be exercised provided it did not “go beyond what
can normally be regarded as professing and practicing one‟s
religion,” as this liberty was subject to general laws.149
To Justice Chik, a Muslim seeking to convert out of Islam had
to get a Syariah court declaration of apostasy (even thought this is
near impossible either because there is no legal provision
144 Article 11(5) of the Singapore Constitution provides: “This Article does not
authorize any act contrary to any general law relating to public order, public
health or morality.” SING. CONST. art. 11(5).
145 Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119, 133 ¶ 29
(Malay.).
146 Id.
147 One of four allegations for the grounds of detention was that the
respondent "converted into Christianity six Malays." Malaysia v. Jamaluddin bin
Othman, [1989] 1 M.L.J. 418 (Malay.) (quoting Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ, Minister
for Home Affairs).
148 See Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia‟s Internal
Security Act, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1345 (2003).
149 Bari criticized Jamaluddin as a decision which “could not fit into the
history and character” of the Federation as he thought it failed to consider the
supremacy of Islam in article 3 or to “take into account the intimate relationship
between the Malays and Islam” which would presumably lead to a greater
readiness to find public order imperiled. Abdul Aziz Bari, Islam in the Federal
Constitution: A Commentary on the Decision in Meor Atiqulrahman, 2 MALAY.
L.J., at cxxxiii (2002).
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facilitating this and because the courts have never granted a
Malay an apostasy order); that is, the decision was not decided by
constitutional standards but by religious standards. Justice Chik
referred to Article 160 of the Malay Constitution which defines
“Malay” as a “person who professes the religion of Islam,
habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to Malay custom .
. . .” He then stated that Lina Joy, as an ethnic Malay, “remains in
the Islamic faith until his or her dying days.”150 Thus, if this is the
correct legal interpretation, Malays are barred from converting out
of Islam. This violation of conscience and the freedom to choose,
change or reject a religion is an oppressive ascription of
constitutional identity. A more humane and rights-based approach
towards handling apostasy and religious freedom would be to
exclude a murtad (former Malay Muslim) from the constitutional
definition of “Malay” and the privileges this class is entitled to as
bumiputera.
Further, if Justice Chik‟s interpretation is correct, an equal
protection issue under Article 8 arises. A non-Malay convert to
Islam (mualaf) who decides to leave Islam must report such
decision to the relevant state Islamic authority who determines the
validity of such renunciation: Hun Mun Meng.151 Thus, distinct
regimes emerge for three categories of Malaysian citizens based on
their religious identity. First, all Malays are ipso facto Muslims by
dint of Article 160, regardless of personal choice. Thus, renouncing
Islam would be a legal impossibility, as the Constitution assigns
an immutable religious identity. Recourse to the Syariah court to
determine the validity of a declaration of apostasy would be
redundant. Second, all non-Malay Muslims who decide to leave
Islam have a qualified right to change religion, contingent upon
receiving official religious approval from the relevant state
religious authority. This reduces religious freedom to a license.
Third, all non-Muslims persons professing a faith enjoy
unhindered freedom of religious choice; religious freedom is
conceived of as an inherent individual entitlement, consonant with
the human right to religious freedom. Thus, the application of
Article 11(1) differs, owing to the judicial erection of different
regimes governing Muslim and non-Muslim religious choice.
Lina Joy, [2004] 2 M.L.J. 119 at 143H, ¶ 58.
Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Sembilan v. Hun Mun Meng, [1992] 2 M.L.J.
676, 143I, ¶ 58 (Malay.).
150
151
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Muslims are afforded a truncated scope of religious liberty and
receive unequal protection. The dictates of the positive syariah
law, so conceived and applied by Syariah courts, apparently trump
constitutional norms by creating an exceptional regime where
constitutional norms do not apply, contrary to the tenet of
constitutional supremacy.
Furthermore, Justice Chik invoked Article 3 in a dubious,
legally unsound manner by extending the application of Islamic
values in Malaysian public law, contrary to precedent.
Article 3 provides that Islam is the religion of the Federation,
but other religions may be practiced in peace and harmony in any
part of the Federation. In the Supreme Court decision of Che
Omar bin Che Soh v. Public Prosecutor, the meaning of “Islam” in
the constitutional context was discussed.152 British colonial rule,
by introducing a secular legal system, had rolled back and confined
the application of Islamic laws to personal matters, dividing Islam
into public and private spheres,153 not treating it as ad-adeen.154
Islam itself is holistic in terms of prescribing a way of life and does
not differentiate between the temporal and spiritual.
Lord President Tun Salleh Abas, a Muslim, recognized that
Islam was “not just a mere collection of dogmas and rituals,” but “a
complete way of life covering all fields of human activities, may
they be private or public, legal, political, economic, social, cultural,
moral or judicial.”155 Nevertheless, he distinguished this from the
meaning of “Islam” in Article 3. In feeling bound to adopt the
meaning of “Islam” as comprehended by the constitutional framers,
“until the law and the system is changed,” he stated:
[W]e have to set aside our personal feelings because the law in
this country is still what it is today, secular law, where
morality not accepted by the law is not enjoying the status of
law. Perhaps that argument should be addressed at other
forums or at seminars and, perhaps, to politicians and

Che Omar bin Che Soh v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1988] 2 M.L.J. 55 (Malay.).
Id. at 56H-I.
154 SIMON C. SMITH, BRITISH RELATIONS WITH THE MALAY RULERS FROM
DECENTRALISATION TO MALAYAN INDEPENDENCE 1930-1957, 102 (1995).
155 Che Omar, 2 M.L.J. at 56C (quoting SAYED ABUL „ALA MAUDOOD, THE
ISLAMIC LAW AND CONSTITUTION (7th ed. 1980)).
152
153
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Parliament.156

British rule thus “secularized” public law and confined the
scope of application of Islamic law:
The development of the public aspect of Islam had left the
religion as a mere adjunct to the ruler‟s power and sovereignty.
The ruler ceased to be regarded as God‟s vicegerent on earth
but was regarded as a sovereign within his territory. The
concept of sovereignty ascribed to humans is alien to Islamic
religion because in Islam, sovereignty belongs to God alone.
By ascribing sovereignty to the ruler, i.e.[,] to a human, the
divine source of legal validity is severed and thus the British
turned the system into a secular institution. Thus all laws
including administration of Islamic laws had to receive this
validity through a secular fiat. Although theoretically because
the sovereignty of the ruler was absolute in the sense that he
could do what he likes, and govern according to what he
thought fit, the Anglo/Malay Treaties restricted this power . . .
. The law was only applicable to Muslims as their personal
law . . . during the British colonial period, through their
system of indirect rule and establishment of secular
institutions, Islamic law was rendered isolated in a narrow
confinement of the law of marriage, divorce and inheritance
only. 157

In addition, when the Independence Merdeka Constitution
was being drafted, there were reservations over the inclusion of the
word “Islam” in Article 3.158 The sole dissenting member of the
Reid Constitutional Commission, Pakistani Justice Abdul Hamid,
supported the Alliance159 proposal to include in the text an
“innocuous” Islam clause.160 This was adopted after assurances
were given that its inclusion did not change the status quo

Id. at 57E-F.
Id. at 56I-F (quoting MICHAEL BARRY HOOKER, ISLAMIC LAW IN SOUTH-EAST
ASIA (1984)).
158 Joseph Fernando, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, 37
J. SE. ASIAN STUD. 249, 253 (2006).
159 The Alliance was a combination of the political parties of the three main
communities in Malaysia: United Malays National Organisation (UMNO),
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and Malayan Indian Congress. Since
independence, UMNO has dominated the system of parliamentary government.
160 Fernando, supra note 158, at 256.
156
157
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regarding Islam‟s symbolic role in the constitutional order.161 The
Alliance assured the Colonial Office that “Malaya would be a
secular state,” without elaborating upon the meaning of
secularity.162 Within the Alliance, the United Malays National
Organization (“UMNO”) leaders had to ensure their non-Muslim
counterparts that the clause would be symbolic and that it was not
intended to have practical effect,163 and would not entail the
creation of a Muslim theocracy, in order to secure their
acquiescence.164 As UMNO and Alliance leader Tunku Abdul
Rahman clarified during 1958 legislative council debates, Malaysia
“is not an Islamic state as it is generally understood, we merely
provide that Islam shall be the official religion of the State.165 The
understanding was that Article 3 merely fixed the official religion.
B. Malaysia and Islamic Revivalism: Breaching the Social
Compact and Precipitating Tensions
As borne out through constitutional history and apex court
precedent, Malaysia is constitutionally a secular state.166
Constitutional orthodoxy has been blithely disregarded in
subsequent cases, in the face of political Islamic revivalism, which
has seeped into judicial reasoning. Justice Chik in Lina Joy,
argued that Article 3 had a “far wider and meaningful purpose”
than merely a symbolic role, and emphasized that by dint of Article
161 REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (1957),
¶ 161, reprinted in KEVIN YL TAN & THIO LI-ANN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 968 (Butterworths Asia 2d ed. 1977).
162 FERNANDO, supra note 82, at 162-63. See also J. Norman Parmer,
Constitutional Change in Malaya‟s Plural Society, 26 FAR E. SURVEY 149 (1957).
163 A.J. Harding, Islam and Public Law in Malaysia: Some Reflections in the
Aftermath of Susie Teoh‟s Case, 1 MALAY. L.J., at xci (1991); FERNANDO, supra
note 82, at 162.
164 FERNANDO, supra note 82, at 162-63.
165 CONTEMPORARY MALAYSIA 156 (Wu Min Aun ed., 1999) (quoting Official
Report of Legislative Council Debates (1958)). In 1984, former Prime Minister
Tunku Abdul Rahman stated: “this country is a secular state. It means that it is
not a Muslim state. Islam is the official religion of this country, but other religions
have a right to play their part as far as religion is concerned. That is about it but
it is not absolutely a secular state because if it were so, there would be officially
no religion. The Constitution has more or less settled the point.” Tunku Abdul
Rahman Putra, The Role of Religion in Nation Building, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES
ON MALAYSIAN RELIGIONS 25 (Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra et al. eds., 1984).
166 Joseph M. Fernando, The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia,
37 J. SE. ASIAN STUD. 249, 249-66 (2006).
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3, “Islam is given a special position and status.”167 He then took a
quantum leap of illogic in positing the supremacy of Article 3 and
his vision of Islam, which qualified the Article 11 religious freedom
guarantee. Justice Chik sought to give effect to the supremacy of
Islamic values and a particular Islamic view of apostasy through
attributing a quasi-grundnorm status to Article 3 and through
that, to syariah law. This is creative revisionism, which displays
infidelity to constitutional history, lacks any principled analysis,
ignores the canons of constitutional construction, and
demonstrates how Justices can abdicate their task in succumbing
to the politicization of Islam in a country where political parties
seek to outstrip each other through religious fervor to gain popular
support.
One of the functions of the constitution is that it serves as a
pre-commitment strategy, entrenching principles on whose basis
minorities join a polity. In the case of Malaysia, this was the
secularity of the Malaysian state. These latter-day judicial
interpretations ride roughshod over constitutional values by
ascribing supreme status to Islam168 and interpreting
[2004] 2 M.L.J. 119 at 127C, ¶ 12.
This was evident in the High Court case of Meor Atiqulrahman bin Ishak v.
Fatimah bte Sihi, [2000] 5 M.L.J. 375, decided on August 6, 1999 by the High
Court of Seremban concerning the Serban Controversy, which was reversed by
the Federal Court. Justice Noor had treated the supremacy of Islam as a sort of
quasi-constitutional grundnorm framing his interpretive matrix. He declared:
“Islam is not of equal status with the other religions; it does not sit alongside or
stand together. Islam sits above, it walks first, and is placed in an open space
with a loud voice. Islam is like the teak tree – tall, firm and able. Otherwise,
Islam will not be the religion of the Federation but just another of the few
religions professed in the country and everybody would be equally free to practice
any religion, with none better than any other.” He considered the government
duty bound to actively promote Islam: “[T]he government is responsible for
taking care of, improve and develop Islam as is done by the current government,
for example building mosques and religious centers, sponsoring musabaqah alQuran, reciting the al-Quran, restricting acts forbidden by Islam like banning
alcohol, gambling, prostitution and undesirable cultures, and by right should
include making laws to ensure that religious places of other religions do not
exceed or compete with National / State Mosques in terms of location and
prominence, size and overly-majestic architecture, or too many and everywhere
without control. Other religions must be arranged and directed to ensure that
they are practiced peacefully and do not threaten the dominant position of Islam,
not just at the present but more importantly in the future and beyond.”
(Translated from Malay). For an analysis, see Li-ann Thio & Jaclyn Ling-Chen
Neo, Religious Dress in Schools: The Serban Controversy in Malaysia, 55 INT'L &
COMP. L. Q. 671, 671-88 (2006).
167
168
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constitutional provisions through the preferred Islamic values of
certain Justices. This importation of Islamic values into public law
discounts the concerns of religious minorities that Malaysia would
become a Muslim theocracy,169 and the conditions of the social
compact which grounded their entry into the Malaysian federation.
This has been a cause of fear and tension and a source of political
instability. Infidelity to constitutional values can thus precipitate
social instability, whether in a court of law or a court of public
opinion.
Whereas “secularism” in Singapore entails the government
treating all religions equally and with a respectful attitude,170 in
Malaysia, Islam is given a privileged position,171 reflecting the
desire of certain sectors to break Islamic values free from the
narrow confines on personal and religious life so that it can
influence and shape public law and public life, and indeed, nonMuslims.172 This has disquieted other religious minorities and has
169 FERNANDO, supra note 82, at 217 (discussing the assurances given by
UMNO leaders to British officials that Malaya would be a secular state and not a
theocracy).
170 A Government official has noted that while Singapore is secular, it is not
atheistic, that the government should not be antagonistic to religious beliefs and
the government “is secular but it is certainly not atheistic.” Singapore‟s Political
Arena,
STRAITS
TIMES,
May
27,
2009,
available
at
www.law.nus.edu.sg/news/archive/2009/ST270509.pdf.
See also Li-ann Thio,
Control, Co-optation and Co-Operating: Managing Religious Harmony in
Singapore‟s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State, 33 HASTINGS INT‟L & COMP. L. REV.
197, 197-253 (2007); Li-ann Thio, Secularism, the Singapore Way, STRAITS TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2007; Li-ann Thio, Religion in the Public Sphere of Singapore: Wall of
Division or Public Square?, in RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 73-104 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 2008).
171 There are constitutional provisions which relate to Islam apart from Article
3, such as Article 12(2) which provides that state funds can be awarded to Islamic
educational institutions, so it is clear Malaysia does not practice a strict
separationist model of religion and state. MALAY . CONST . art.12(2).
172 For example, in child custody cases where a non-Muslim couple fight for
custody of their children, after the husband converts to Islam, it has been held
that non-Muslims are subject to the jurisdiction of syariah courts, even though
the Constitution provides that syariah courts have limited jurisdiction over
specified matters and only over Muslims. List II (State List) Para. 1 of the Malay
Constitution reads: “Except with respect to the Federal Territories of Kuala
Lumpur and Labuan, Islamic law and personal and family law of persons
professing the religion of Islam, including the Islamic law relating to succession,
testate and intestate, betrothal, marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance, adoption,
legitimacy guardianship, gifts, partitions and noncharitable trusts; Wakafs and
the definition and regulation of charitable and religious endowments, institutions,
trusts, charities and charitable institutions operating wholly within the State;
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harmed Malaysia‟s reputation for respecting religious diversity
and religious freedom.173
C. Philippines and Muslim Mindanao: Gridlock in the Face of
Intransigence Between the Supreme and the Divine
The call for an Islamic state in the south of Philippines by
separatist groups to establish a system of life and governance
acceptance of Moro Muslims raises various contentious
constitutional clashes.174
The desire to have the Islamic Quran as the basic law of the
land clashes with the status of the Philippines Constitution as the
supreme law of the land, flowing from its direct promulgation by
the sovereign Filipino people.175 This reflects a central tenet of
modern democracy but, as Santos observes, “it is simply
unthinkable to subordinate the God-given Quran to the man-made
or even people-made Philippine Constitution. This is a matter or
article of faith, where exalting the Constitution would be akin to
shirk (idolatry), one of the worst sins in Islam . . . . The Quran
trumps the Constitution.”176 In this worldview, the Quran is a
“veritable super-Constitution which covers the laws of marriage
and family, of property and succession, of trade and commerce, of
crime and punishment, of society and government, and of all other
spheres of life.”177 This would include political ideology and, as
such, it could not be inferior to the Constitution.178 This school of
Malay customs. Zakat, Fitrah and Baitulmal or similar Islamic religious revenue,
mosques or any Islamic public places of worship, creation and punishment of
offences by persons professing the religion of Islam against precepts of that
religion, except in regard to matters included in the Federal List; the constitution,
organization and procedure of Syariah courts, which shall have jurisdiction only
over person professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the
matters included in this paragraph, but shall not have jurisdiction in respect of
offences except in so far as conferred by federal law[], the control of propagating
doctrines and beliefs among persons professing the religion of Islam; the
determination of matters of Islamic law and doctrine Malay custom.”
173 Hannah Beech, Malaysia‟s Crisis of Faith, TIME (Magazine), May 30, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1626300,00.html.
174 SOLIMAN M. SANTOS JR., THE MORO ISLAMIC CHALLENGE: CONSTITUTIONAL
RETHINKING FOR THE MINDANAO PEACE PROCESS 13 (2001).
175 CONST. (1987), Pmbl., (Phil.).
176 SANTOS, supra note 174, at 14.
177 Id.
178 Santos notes that Islamists view the modern Western secular principle of
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Islamic orthodoxy is contrary to the constitutional principle of the
separation of Church and State and the provision against the
establishment of religion.179 This concept is borrowed from the
American model, although it is not followed dogmatically.180
Short of a regime permitting religious autonomy and the
implementation of religious law, such as that in Law No. 11 of
2006 in relation to Aceh, it is difficult to broker peace and
compromise in the face of two dueling and intransigent public
philosophies over the source of supreme law as a basis for ordering
social life.
Ultimately, a clear delineation of jurisdiction between
religious and civil courts and an indication of which is superior in
the judicial hierarchy helps secure a peaceful co-existence,
provided this is accepted and not used by religious entrepreneurs
to stir up political unrest. A case in point is the inter-relationship
between syariah courts and the civil courts in Singapore. Here, the
syariah court is subject to some degree of oversight by the civil
High Court, as in the case of Mohd Ismail bin Ibrahim v. Mohd
Taha bin Ibrahim.181 Here, the defendant-trustee had sought the
opinion of the Fatwa Committee of Islamic Religious Council
(“MUIS”) (which gives religious rulings) as to validity of will
according to Muslim law under AMLA (Administration of Muslim
Law Act).182 It found that various religious leaders from MUIS
misconstrued the validity of a Muslim‟s will and one of them, the
Mufti, who had validated the will as a beneficiary, had

church-state separation as the root cause for the lack of morality and decline in
spirituality in many Western / Western-oriented governments and societies. Id. at
18.
179 CONST. (1987), Art. III § 5, (Phil.)
“No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Id. The 1987
Philippines Constitution also prohibits the appropriation of public money for
religious uses and prohibits religious political parties). Id.
180 Id., e.g., support of military chaplains, tax exemptions, the presidential
oath and the invocation of God in the constitutional preamble.
181 Mohd Ismail bin Ibrahim v. Mohd Taha bin Ibrahim, [2004] 4 S.L.R. 756;
see also Hairani Saban Hardjoe, Hukum Faraid and the Application of AMLA as
“The Statutory Adjunct of Muslim Law in Singapore”: Legal Reflection on the Case
of Mohamed Ismail Bin Ibrahim v. Mohd Taha Bin Ibrahim, LAW GAZETTE, Oct.
2006, available at http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2006-10/default.htm.
182 Administration of Muslim Law Act ch. 3 (2005) (Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?&actno=Reved3&date=latest&method=part [hereinafter AMLA].
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contravened the common law rule against bias.183 Justice Rubin
noted that “[i]t is an important principle of Western as well as
Muslim jurisprudence that a person cannot be a Justice in his own
course” and the involvement of the Mufti who chaired the MUIS
fatwa committee tended to “present the process in a somewhat
lesser light.”184 In evaluating Islamic law and its four sources
(Quran [holy text], Hadith [tradition of Prophets, oral precepts],
Ijmaa [consensus among scholars] and Qiyas [reasoning by
analogy]),185 Justice Rubin, a civil court Justice, adopted a
cautious approach in evaluating expert opinion from both sides.
For example, he took note of whether an opinion was broadly
shared or whether there were differing viewpoints on the issue in
assessing its weight.186
Essentially, the High Court Justice was informing the Mufti
and MUIS fatwa committee that they had misconstrued Islamic
law under AMLA (as opposed to Islamic law simpliciter); thus the
fatwa committee is not an authority unto itself. Furthermore,
when the counsel for MUIS said that the Mufti Tuan Isa was “not
legally trained in civil law and is called to testify only on Muslim
law,” this perplexed Justice Rubin.187 This is because Tuan Isa
was distinguishing Muslim law simpliciter as opposed to Muslim
law as regulated by AMLA as a statute enacted by the secular
institution of Parliament. Justice Rubin noted that AMLA was “an
essential statutory adjunct of Muslim law in Singapore.”188 This
indicates that religious or Islamic law is subordinate to secular law
and that the religious courts are not applying divine law in an
unbounded fashion, but only to the extent permitted by statute.
This indicates the limited role of syariah courts as courts of limited
or inferior jurisdiction, empowered to give out inheritance
certificates setting out the fixed proportions of each legal heir. As
183 Mohd Ismail bin Ibrahim v. Mohd Taha bin Ibrahim, [2004] 4 S.L.R. 756,
780 ¶ 55; see also PETER CANE, INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 143-167
(2004).
184 Mohd Ismail, [2004] 4 S.L.R. at 780, ¶ 55.
185 Id.
186 Id. ¶ 43 (Justice Rubin noting “I do not propose to second-guess the
scholarship and erudition contained in the said commentary” but notes that the
work is not a single viewpoint but rather provides “differing viewpoints of two
well-respected shaiks (leaders).”).
187 Id. ¶ 63.
188 Id. ¶ 63.
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the religious court was not a court of superior jurisdiction, the
High Court in its exercise of supervisory jurisdiction was tasked
with ensuring that the terms of Section 114 of AMLA with respect
to testamentary disposition were observed.189 In this sense,
secular law regulates the boundaries of sacred law.

D. Multi-Religious Societies and the Agnostic State as Protector of
Racial and Religious Minorities: Secularism, Singapore Style
The failure to accommodate sizeable Muslim minorities of
some ten million through reaching a just peace settlement has
stymied the economic development of Muslim Mindanao in the
South Philippines. There have been two failed attempts to
negotiate peace in 1976 and 1996190 in this Catholic-majority state,
largely owing to political corruption, poor governance and the nonaccommodation of Moro Muslims.
In contrast, Singapore has successfully addressed the question
of politically accommodating Muslim minorities while pursuing the
egalitarian policy of meritocracy.
This stems from the
apprehension of the centrality of religion and ethnicity to their
lives, motivating the search for legal methods to incorporate these
identities and to permit their expression in the public sphere.
While the Singapore Constitution does not contain specific
minority rights, Article 12 prohibits discrimination, inter alia, on
the basis of race.191 Article 15 guarantees the religious freedom of
persons and of religious institutions to hold property, manage their
own affairs, and generally enjoy the communal dimensions of
religious life.192 While there is no scheme of special privileges for
Malays, Article 152 imposes a constitutional responsibility on the
government to “constantly . . . care for the interests of the racial
and religious minorities in Singapore.”193
In exercising its
functions, the government is to “recognize the special position of
the Malays, who are the indigenous people of Singapore, and
Mohd Ismail, [2004] 4 S.L.R. ¶¶ 60-65, at 781-783.
The Tripoli Agreement, Phil.-Moro National Liberation Front, Feb. 8, 2006;
Philippines-Mindanao Peace Agreement, Phil-Moro National Liberation Front,
Sep. 2, 1996.
191 SING. C ONST . art. 12(2).
192 Id. art. 15(2)-(3).
193 Id. art. 152.
189
190
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accordingly it shall be the responsibility of the government to
protect, safeguard, support, foster, and promote their political,
educational, religious, economic, social, and cultural interests and
the Malay language.”194 In affirming the multicultural character of
Singapore society, Article 153A recognizes the four official
languages of “Malay, Mandarin, Tamil, and English,” while Malay
is the national language.195 In addition, nothing is to prejudice the
Government‟s right “to preserve and sustain the use and study of
the language of any other community in Singapore.”196
E. Statutory Facilitation of Muslim Communal Life – Pragmatic
Secularism
From the outset, a conscious decision was taken not to have an
established religion: “[l]et us face up to this problem of multiculture, multi-religions and multi-languages. Alone in South East
Asia, we are a State without an established church.”197 Indeed, the
principle of religious accommodation and legal pluralism is
constitutionally enshrined. Article 153 provides: “The Legislature
shall by law make provision for regulating Muslim religious affairs
and for constituting a Council to advise the President in matters
relating to the Muslim religion.”198 Pursuant to this, Chapter 3 of
the Administration of Muslim Law Act (“AMLA”) was adopted.
The Muslim community, through the Islamic Religious Council
(“MUIS”), is statutorily empowered under the AMLA to collect
funds for building mosques.199 Muslims enjoy the privilege of
utilizing government machinery to aid in collections for the
Mosque Building funds. This privilege is not extended to any other
religious minorities, even though the Hindus have so requested. 200
Id. art. 152(2).
Id. art 153A.
196 Id. art. 153A(2)(b).
197 No Dominance by Religious Group over Others – Lee, STRAITS TIMES,
(Sing.), Jan. 5, 1967, at 6.
198 SING. C ONST . art. 153.
199 AMLA, supra note 182, ch. 3, pt. V, §§ 74-79.
200 Id. ch. 3, pt. V, § 78. Compulsory Muslim contributions towards the Mosque
Building Fund are collected through the Central Provident Fund system pursuant
to Section 78 of AMLA, with this concession being recognized as a “special one”
which would “not be a precedent for other religious or ethnic groups.” Id. It was
not thought necessary to introduce legislation to allow donations to the Hindu
Endowments Board to be collected through the CPF Board as “it would be no less
194
195
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MUIS also is empowered to continue the Islamic charitable
practice of collecting zakat to meet the social welfare needs of the
poorer members of the community.201
That the state is able to lend support to a religious group flows
from its version of “accommodative secularism” and the judicial
confirmation that the establishment, in terms of financial or nonfinancial support, of a religion, is not proscribed.202 However, this
does entail some degree of state involvement in matters related to
religion. For example, the President of the syariah court is
appointed by the President of Singapore, on the advice of the
Cabinet.203 The government also has a role in appointing up to
seven members of the Majlis Ugama Islam (Islamic Religious
Council, a statutory body), whose functions as stipulated in Section
3 includes advising the Singapore President “in matters relating to
the Muslim religion in Singapore,” and to administer related
matters including halal certification, haj pilgrimages and religious
schools. MUIS focuses on helping the Muslim community to
develop and to integrate national society, while preserving
religious and cultural identity and practices. Indeed, the civil
courts in Angliss Singapore Pte, Ltd. v. Public Prosecutor204 upheld
a conviction under Section 88 of AMLA which makes it an offence
of strict liability for the sale of halal food, whether by a Muslim or
non-Muslim seller, without MUIS certification and approval. 205 In
this case, the food, “Dewfresh” chicken nuggets, was halal but
exhibited the wrong label, which lacked MUIS approval. In noting
absolute liability and the fact that there was no intent to provoke
racial discord in this case, Justice Rajah observed that “Parliament
has deemed it fit that the religious sensitivity or welfare of the
general public should warrant a high standard of care by all those
engaged in the particular activities governed by statutes imposing
convenient for Hindus to make their regular contributions . . . through the POSB.”
DR. AHMAD MATTER, SING. PARL. REP. NO. 42, cols. 309-11 (Dec. 3, 1982) (noting
contributions from Hindus for Temples, etc., and Monies from Muslims for
Mosques, etc.).
201 Section 3(d) of the AMLA states that “to administer the collection of zakat
and fitrah and other charitable contributions for the support and promotion of the
Muslim religion or for the benefit of Muslims in accordance with this Act.” AMLA,
supra note 182, ch. 3, pt. II, § 3(2)(d).
202 Chan v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1994] 3 S.L.R. 662 (Sing.).
203 AMLA, supra note 182, ch. 3, § 7(1)(a).
204 Angliss Singapore Pte, Ltd. v. Pub. Prosecutor, [2006] 4 S.L.R. 653 (Sing.).
205 Id. ¶¶ 29, 31.
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strict liability,” and that “Parliament views halal certification as
an issue of vital importance.”206 Justice Rajah also noted that
Section 88 of AMLA only provided for individuals, rather than
corporate entities, to be sued. This lacuna was addressed when
AMLA was amended in 2008 to enhance sentences for breaching
halal regulations and to allow both individuals and corporations to
be prosecuted. The Muslim Affairs Minister, Yaacob Ibrahim,
acknowledged his gratitude to Justice Rajah for his “astute
observation and suggestion that AMLA be amended” and stated
that “I believe every Muslim in Singapore will take comfort in
knowing that the authorities take a serious view of a matter that is
important to all Muslims.”207 Muslim parliamentarian Hawazi
Daipi observed that Parliament, in amending AMLA in 2008 to
confer upon MUIS the power to collect fines of up to SGD $2000,
indicated the “unique role” of MUIS, the Islamic Religious Council
of Singapore, established by statute, in a multi-racial, multireligious society:
It is significant that while Singapore Muslims are a
minority of the Singapore population comprising of
approximately 14% of the population, the Bill envisages
MUIS, a body regulating Muslim affairs, having the
authority to fine anyone or any corporation who
disrespects
Muslims
by
misrepresenting
halal
certificationor breaching other matters. To me, this
reflects the Singapore Government‟s commitment to
fostering respect for important religious practices and
safeguarding the interests of minorities in Singapore.208
Thus, secular law is channeled towards realizing the concerns
of a significant religious minority in relation to their dietary laws.
There is no strict and dogmatic separation of religion and state in
this respect, where the government discharges its constitutional
responsibility under Article 152(1) to “constantly care for the
interests of the racial and religious minorities in Singapore.” In
particular Article 152(2) of the Constitution provides that the
government shall exercise its functions in a manner which
Id. ¶ 31, at 666.
YAACOB IBRAHIM, 85 SING. PARL. REP. NO. 85 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at
http://www.parliament.gov.sg./Publications/sprs.htm.
208 Id.
206
207
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recognizes “the special position of the Malays” as Singapore‟s
indigenous peoples, and thereby the government is “to protect,
safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational,
religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay
language.” It does so through its accommodative approach towards
enforcing standards protecting Muslim dietary laws.209
In contrast, the Philippines adopted the American doctrine of
the “separation of church and state.”210 In the 2003 decision of
Islamic Da‟Wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of Muslim
Affairs,211 the Supreme Court declared that halal certification
could not be done by a government agency as this would entail
having a government body rule on religious matters, i.e., being
involved in a religious function.212 They rejected an argument that
209 AMLA also permits polygamy, contrary to the general norm of monogamy
enshrined in the Woman‟s Charter (Ch. 353). These gender inegalitarian norms
had to be subject to insulation from the application of the Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) which
Singapore acceded to in 1995. Singapore attached a reservation stating: “In the
context of Singapore's multi-racial and multi-religious society and the need to
respect the freedom of minorities to practise their religious and personal laws, the
Republic of Singapore reserves the right not to apply the provisions of articles 2
and 16 where compliance with these provisions would be contrary to their
religious or personal laws.” CONVENTION FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW), RESERVATIONS AND DECLARATIONS
(2001), available at http://www.bayefsky.com/html/singapore_t2_cedaw.php. See
generally Li-ann Thio, She‟s a Woman, But She Acts Very Fast, in MIXED
BLESSINGS: LAW, RELIGIONS, AND WOMEN‟S RIGHTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 24177 (Amanda Whiting & Carolyn Evans eds., 2006); Li-ann Thio, The Impact of
Internationalization on Domestic Governance: The Transformative Potential of
CEDAW, 1 SING. J. INT‟L & COMP. L., 278, 278-350 (1997).
210 C ONST .
(1987), Art. II, (Phil.) available at http://www.lawphil.
net/consti/cons1987.html. Section 6, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that “[t]he separation of the Church and State shall be inviolable.” Id.
211 Islamic Da‟Wah Coucil Phil., Inc., v. Office Executive Sec‟y President Phil.,
G.R.
No.
153888
(Jul.
9,
2003).
(Phil.),
available
at
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jul2003/gr_ 153888_2003.html.
The
Office of Muslim Affairs or OMA was created by Executive Order No. 697 in 1981
“to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the mainstream of Filipino
society with due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions, and institutions.” Id.
OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and economic concerns of the Muslim
community as a “national cultural community” and not as a religious group. Id.
Given the principle of separation of Church and State extant in the Philippines,
the state must ensure the OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest
it violate the non-establishment clause and the “free exercise of religion” provision
found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Id.
212 Id. “Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a religious
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the state was validly exercising its police powers in protecting
Filipinos‟ “right to health and to instill health consciousness in
them.”213 The Court agreed with the petitioner‟s contention that
“[i]t is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies
and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because said
scheme is a function only [of] religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.”214
Clearly, some of the statutory functions of Singapore‟s MUIS would
contravene the Philippines‟ doctrine of the “separation of church
and state.” Thus, the Singapore model of secularism is not
dogmatic or doctrinaire, but pragmatic.
F. Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy for Religious Minorities
Sufficient political and cultural space has been accorded to
Muslim minorities, who are predominantly Malay, to identify with
Singapore‟s economic success rather than to resent it.215 The policy
of meritocracy centers around ensuring equal access to education,
such that success is predicated on merit, rather than on ethnoreligious identity. Muslim students, like students of any other
faith, may excel and enjoy the social mobility that accompanies it.
On the contrary, it has been observed that educational
institutions catering to Muslims in the autonomous regions in the
Philippines are comparatively deficient, given the poor quality of
educators, particularly in relation to English language

function because the standards used are drawn from the Qur‟an and Islamic
beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO
46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein
petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for Muslim
consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications,
the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur‟an and Sunnah on halal food.” Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Tackling Unrest in Thai South: S'pore Offers
Examples for Inter-faith Relations, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Jul. 20, 2008, available
at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_content.asp?View,7758; Speech, Prime Minister
Lee Hsien Loong, Mendaki's 25th Anniversary Dinner and Awards Presentation
(Sept.
2,
2007),
transcript
available
at
http://www.pmo.gov.sg/News/Speeches/Prime+Minister/Speech+by+PM+Lee+at+
Mendakis+25th+Anniversary+Dinner+and+Awards+Presentation.htm (detailing
achievements of Malay community).
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proficiency,216 which translates into unequal educational
opportunities. Consequently, many Moros are unable to pass the
national civil service examination, which means less access to
employment opportunities. This hinders both poverty alleviation
and economic development in the autonomous areas. In terms of
the private sector, the perception that Catholics are favored over
Muslims generates a “victim” mentality amongst Muslims.217
The Singapore government treads a fine line in seeking to
reconcile the cultural needs of the Malay Muslim minority with
those of national objectives. For example, the government plan to
require compulsory primary education under the Compulsory
Education Act (Chapter 51) was criticized as a threat to madrasahs
(Islamic religious schools), and therefore to Muslim religious and
cultural activity.218 The fear was that the real intention was to
eliminate the last bastion of autonomous Islamic activity in
Singapore.
To allay these fears, the government struck a
compromise by exempting madrasahs from the statutory regime.
Madrasahs are an important source of cultural identity and
producer of future religious leaders. However, madrasahs were
still subject to minimal educational standards and national
primary school examinations, designed to ensure the future
employability of its graduates.219 Thus, the government does
216 The English language proficiency of many teachers in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is equivalent to that of Grade 2 and 3
students in public elementary schools nationwide. Only 5 per cent of all teachers
in the region are qualified to teach, according to a study conducted by the United
States Agency for International Development. Taharudin Piang Ampatuan et al.,
Ensuring a Thriving Community, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 28, 2008, available
at
http://www.pvtr.org/pdf/ICPVTRinNews/Ensuring%20a%20thriving%20communit
y.pdf.
217 Ampatuan et al., supra note 216.
218 See Press Release, PERGAS, Pergas‟ Stand on Compulsory Education,
(Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.pergas.org.sg/Resources PRleases.htm.
See generally Lily Zubaidah Rahim, Governing Islam and Regulating Muslims in
Singapore‟s Secular Authoritarian State (Asia Research Centre, Murdoch Univ.,
Working
Paper
No.
156,
2009),
available
at
http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/wp/wp156.pdf.
219 Mukhlis Abu Bakar, Between State Interests and Citizen Rights: Whither
the Madrasah, in SECULARISM AND SPIRITUALITY: SEEKING INTEGRATED KNOWLEDGE
AND SUCCESS IN MADRASAH EDUCATION IN SINGAPORE 29 (Noor Aisha Abdul
Rahman & Lai Ah Eng eds., 2006). See also Tan Tey Keong, Social Capital and
State-Civil Society Relations in Singapore 1, 1 n.3 (Nat‟l Univ. of Sing. & Adjunct
Fellow Inst. of Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 9, 2001), available at
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retain some supervisory oversight over religious schools while
preserving a degree of cultural and religious autonomy for a
religious institution sufficient to placate a concerned minority.220
Even where serious public health issues are concerned, the
Singapore Government, acting consistently with its Article 152
obligation, has demonstrated sensitivity towards Muslim concerns
in the field of human organ transplants and even the burial of
Muslim SARs (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) victims during
the 2003 crisis. Muslims were granted an exception to SARs
control measures of cremating victims by being allowed immediate
burial in two sealed body bags.221 In protecting the interests of the
Muslim community, Muslims are given privileged treatment
through policies such as the government sponsored “one mosque
per town” program.222 This pragmatic secularism, unlike the
stricter separationist model practiced in the Philippines, is not
constitutionally barred as links between state and religious
institutions and are not precluded by a “establishment‟ clause.
Chief Justice Yong, in Colin Chan v. Public Prosecutor, noted that
“the Singapore Constitution does not prohibit the “establishment of
any religion,” which relates to providing financial or non-pecuniary
support for a religion, as the Singapore government does in
relation to Islam.223
While seeking to be neutral between religions, the government
appreciates the close conflation in fact between race and religion
(Malay and Islam) and is solicitous towards protecting Malays and
their sensitivities in the interest of social harmony. For example,

http://www. spp.nus.edu.sg/ips/docs/publications/wp9.pdf.
220 Bakar, supra note 219, at 36-48.
221 Jane Lee, No Wakes for Suspected SARs Deaths, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.),
Apr. 24, 2003, at H4.
222 See Press Release, Encik Othman Wok, Minister of Social Affairs,
Ministerial Statement on the Increase in the Rate of Mosque Building Fund
Contributions in Parliament (June 29, 1977), available at http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/tmp/ow19770629s.pdf. "The Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura
supports the policy of the Government in building one new mosque in each new
town where the Muslim population is sufficiently large and agrees that this is the
most practical way to meet the religious needs of the Muslims as they are
resettled in the new towns." Id. This is funded through the Mosque Building Fund
Scheme whereby employers are required to pay a small contribution per Muslim
employee per month to the fund and recover this from their Muslim employee
wages. See id.
223 Colin Chan v. Pub. Prosecutor, [1994] 3 S.L.R. 662, 681 (Sing.).
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in 2005, two bloggers224 were charged under Section 4(1)(a) of the
Sedition Act (Chapter 290) with anti-Muslim posts, as these were
acts with a “seditious tendency” defined in Section 3(1)(e) as an act
“to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races
or classes of the population in Singapore.”225 Senior District
Justice Richard Magnus noted the appropriateness of a custodial
sentence for such offences given “the special sensitivity of racial
and religious issues in our multi-cultural society.”226 He alluded
not only to the “current domestic and international security
climate,”227 but to the 1964 race riots and the Maria Hertogh
Senior District Justice Magnus
incident in the 1950s.228
underscored how “callous and reckless remarks on racial or
religious subjects [could] cause social disorder [in] whatever
medium or forum they are expressed, [including the Internet with]
its ubiquitous reach.”229 He noted:
The virtual reality of cyberspace is generally unrefereed. But
one cannot hide behind the anonymity of cyberspace, as each
accused has done, to pen diatribes against another race or
religion. The right to propagate an opinion on the Internet is
not, and cannot, be an unfettered right. The right of one
person‟s freedom of expression must always be balanced by the
right of another‟s freedom from offence, and tampered by wider
public interest considerations. It is only appropriate social
behaviour, independent of any legal duty, of every Singapore
citizen and resident to respect the other races in view of our
multi-racial society. Each individual living here irrespective of
his racial origin owes it to himself and to the country to see
that nothing is said or done which might incite the people and
plunge the country into racial strife and violence. These are
basic ground rules. A fortiori, the Sedition Act statutorily
224 Pub. Prosecutor v. Koh Song Huat Benjamin, [2005] S.G.D.C. 272 (Sing.)
[hereinafter Benjamin].
225 Id. Notably, in 2006, a person who posted an offensive cartoon of Jesus
Christ on his blog received a „stern warning.‟ Zakir Hussain, Blogger Who Posted
Cartoons of Christ Online Being Investigated, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), June 14,
2008,
available
at
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/articlesoutheastasia.asp?parentid=49563.
226 Benjamin, [2005] S.G.D.C. at 272, ¶ 6.
227 Id. ¶ 6.
228 In Re Maria Huberdina Hertogh v. Amina Binte Mohamed, [1951] 1 M.L.J.
12 (Sing.).
229 Benjamin, [2005] S.G.D.C. at 272, ¶ 7.
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delineates this redline on the ground in the subject at hand.
Otherwise, the resultant harm is not only to one racial group
but to the very fabric of our society.230

Senior District Justice Magnus noted that seditious speech
threatened to harm not only a sector of the community (“one racial
group”) but the nation at large (the “very fabric of our society”).231
He took judicial notice of the importance of “basic ground rules,”
the unwritten or informal rules of our “social constitution” which
fashion how we exercise our rights, which invariably entail some
responsibilities.232 These social duties, distinct from legal duties,
inhere in every citizen and resident, obliging them “to respect the
other races in view of our multi-racial society,” to ensure “that
nothing is said or done which might incite the people and plunge
the country into racial strife and violence.”233 Although such social
norms should be implicitly understood, Senior District Justice
Magnus felt the need to articulate these expressly, particularly to
the younger generation of Singaporeans with “short memories”234
who lacked an appreciation of how provoking racial and religious
sensitivities can threaten social harmony. A sense of duty is
bolstered by an understanding of history.
These prosecutions have been characterized as “an example of
our commitment to multi-racial cohesion,” while acknowledging
that elsewhere “such prosecution could be considered as
infringement of freedom of expression.”235
Free speech
jurisprudence is thus context-based and limits are placed where
these threaten racial and religious harmony, which are considered
key components of the rule of law.236 Unlike a society with a
homogenous population “with settled customs and expectations
[where] social responsibility . . . is enforced by peer pressure, nonhomogenous societies face unique challenges.”237 The rule of law
Id. ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 8.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id. ¶ 6.
235 Shunmugam Jayakumar, Keynote Address at the IBA Rule of Law
Symposium: The Meaning and Importance of the Rule of Law (Oct. 19, 2007),
transcript available at http://app2.mlaw.gov.sg/News/tabid/204/ctgy/Speech/
currentpage/5/Default.aspx?ItemId=141.
236 Benjamin, [2005] SGDC at 171, ¶ 18.
237 Id. ¶ 17.
230
231
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makes expectations “transparent” and reduces the friction arising
from social interaction.
The government position is that
“[h]armony in a diverse society cannot be achieved with a laissezfaire system; or the different ethnic, religious, cultural and
language groups will have their own song sheet and the
government as conductor will not produce harmony.”238
By treating all religions as equal and allowing them to
flourish, rather than imposing any one, the Muslim community
sees value and benefit in Singapore‟s model of quasi-secularism,
and its policies of multi-racialism and multi-culturalism. This
acceptance of the system has allowed the government to unify a
diverse society. An environment of civil peace between ethnic or
religious groups helps to foster mutual accommodation, whereas
conflict heightens difference and hinders human development.
G. The 2007 Thai Constitution: Buddhism as an Official Religion?
One of the proposals associated with the drafting of the new
Thai Constitution was that of enumerating Buddhism as a
national religion, since it is a core component of Thai national
identity.239 Although almost 95% of the sixty-five million Thais
profess Buddhism as their religion and the King has always, in
fact, been a Buddhist, Thailand is a secular state, although leading
commentators consider that Buddhism is the “implied” state
religion.240 This issue was raised during the drafting of the 1997
Constitution, but the decision taken was to preserve the status quo
of constitutional secularism, an official indifference to religion
while recognizing religious freedom, to avoid offending other
religious communities and causing social division.241
The Constitution Drafting Assembly (“CDA”), appointed by the

Id.
See BUDDHA DHARMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Buddhism in Thailand
(2002), http://www.buddhanet.net/pdf_file/ buddhinthai.pdf; Duncan McCargo,
Buddhism, Democracy and Identity in Thailand, 11 ROUTLEDGE 155 (2004).
240 Vitit Muntarbhorn, Human Rights in the Era of “Thailand Inc.,” in H UMAN
R IGHTS IN ASIA : A C OMPARATIVE L EGAL S TUDY OF TWELVE ASIAN
J URISDICTIONS , F RANCE AND THE USA 328 (Randall Peerenboom et al. eds.,
2006).
241 Andrew Harding, Buddhism: Human Rights and Constitutional Reform in
Thailand, 2 ASIAN J. COMP . L. 1, 5 n.17 (2007).
238
239
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military junta which seized power in September 2006, voted in
June 2007 (by sixty-six to nineteen vote) not to include
Buddhism.242 The governing fear was that, owing to the sensitivity
of religion and given that there was no precedent for an official
religion, including a reference to Buddhism might prove divisive,
even where Buddhists enjoy an overwhelming majority. This is
because naming a national religion could be seen as an oppressive
assimilationist measure by the Thais in the under-developed
Muslim-majority south which has experienced an insurgency since
2005.243 This could inflame the conflict. There, Islamic law applies
with respect to family matters, administered by religious courts.
The state also provides funding in an effort to integrate Muslim
minorities into Buddhist and Muslim educational institutions, and
provides funds for religious education programs in public and
private schools.244 It also provides daily allowances for Buddhists
and Muslims holding senior ecclesiastical and administrative
posts.245 An outstanding issue which remains to be settled is
whether to permit the establishment of religious schools that teach
Islam. The views over this issue are polarized, ranging from the
desire to respect cultural diversity to the fear that such schools
would be venues for dissent, radicalism and even terrorism.
The preamble to the 2007 draft Constitution states that it
contains significant principles, including that of “upholding all
religions” and references the Buddhist era.246 The supremacy of
242 Thai Charter Drafters Reject Buddhism as National Religion, YAHOO! NEWS
/ AFP, Jun. 30 2007, http://pluralism.org/news/view/16773.
243 When Siam took control over Pattani in South Thailand under the AngloSiamese Treaty of 1909, it took coercive steps to weaken Islamic identity and to
strengthen a mono-ethnic Buddhist populace. Local rulers were replaced by Thai
rulers, Islamic schools were closed and around World War Two, men were
required to wear western-style trousers, Muslims were prevented from adopting
Muslim names or using the Malay dialect and shariah law was replaced by
Buddhist laws of marriage and inheritance, generating resentment. The Pattani
separatist movement following World War Two is an attempt by a Muslim Malay
minority with a distinct cultural identity and lifestyle, to throw off a government
which imposed a dominant Buddhist Thai culture. Andrew Forbes, Thailand‟s
Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession or Coexistence?, ASIAN SURVEY 38,
1056-73 (May 1982).
244 Prashanth Parameswaran, Islamic Education as a Peacemaking Tool: A
Case Study of Southern Thailand, GLOBAL POL., Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.globalpolitics.co.uk/issue4/Parameswaran/.
245 Harding, supra note 241, at 11.
246 THAIL.
CONST. pmbl., available at http://www.asianlii.org/th/legis/
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the Constitution is affirmed (Chapter I, Section 6) and following
past Constitutions, Chapter II Section 9 provides that “[t]he King
is a Buddhist and Upholder of religions.”247 It contains no minority
or group rights as such, though it recognizes the right of “[p]ersons
assembling to be a community” as having the right to conserve
their customs and culture and participate in the management of
natural resources and the environment.248 This appears to be
directed at indigenous groups and such communities that can sue
government agencies to vindicate these environmentally oriented
community rights.
Religious freedom of individuals is thus safeguarded by
Section 37, which provides that:
A person shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion, a
religious denomination or creed, and observe religious precepts
or commandments or exercise a form of worship in accordance
with his belief; provided that it is not contrary to his civic
duties, public order or good morals.249

In exercising the liberty referred to in paragraph one, a person
shall be protected from any act of the State, which is derogatory to
his rights or detrimental to his due benefits on the grounds of
professing a religion, a religious denomination or creed or
observing religious precepts or commandments or exercising a
form of worship in accordance with his different belief from that of
others.
All Thais, irrespective of religion, enjoy equal protection under
the Constitution.250 Interestingly, it is a constitutional duty of
every person to uphold “religions”251 and a state obligation under
Chapter V (Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies)
Part V, Section 79, to protect religions, especially Buddhism,
(which is the only religion named in the Constitution) as a source
of civic virtue and to ensure inter-religious harmony.252 There are
const/2007/1.html.
247 Id. ch. II, § 9.
248 Id. ch. III, pt. 12, § 66.
249 Id. ch. III, pt. 3, § 37.
250 Id. ch. I, § 5. The Thai people, irrespective of their origins, sexes or
religions, shall enjoy equal protection under this Constitution.
251 Id. ch. IV, § 70.
252 THAIL. CONST. ch. V, § 79. The State shall patronize and protect Buddhism
as the religion observed by most Thais for a long period of time and other
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specific provisions relating to Buddhist clergy, such as their
disenfranchisement on election day.253 Such provisions were all
present in the 1997 Constitution. While this disenfranchisement
clause may appear prima facie to be discriminatory, as it does not
apply to other religions; this provision in fact reflects the special
position of Buddhism within the Thai constitutional order insofar
as the apex law considers that Buddhism does not permit its
adherents to be politically partisan. The principle of religious
disqualification actually upholds a central Buddhist tenet that
clergy not be involved in earthly affairs, given the focus of
Buddhism on attaining karma to achieve nirvana (release from
earthly suffering). In other words, a Buddhist tenet trumps a
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and nondiscrimination on the basis of religion.
The move to identify Buddhism as the national religion
reflects a strain of Buddhist nationalism and a possible decline in
the policy of religious tolerance, if such nationalism turns against
minority faiths. Buddhist activists were motivated by a fear that
Buddhism was under siege, given the attacks by the 1.3 million
ethnic Malay Muslims in the separatist south against Buddhist
clergy and buildings.254
Indeed, reportedly, entire Buddhist
communities had fled to escape brutal violence.255 It was thought
that the official recognition of Buddhism was necessary to ensure it
continues the country‟s main religion.
As a cautionary tale, some Buddhists argue against raising the
status of Buddhism through the Constitution, pointing to the
negative effects of the successful parallel effort to constitutionally
enshrine Buddhism in Sri Lanka, a country mired in civil
conflict.256 The mixture of Buddhism and nationalism is a
religions, promote good understanding and harmony among followers of all
religions as well as encourage the application of religious principles to create
virtue and develop the quality of life. Id.
253 Id. ch. VI, pt. II, § 100.
254 Doug
Bandow,
A
Buddhist Threat
to
Religious
Freedom?,
FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM, Sept. 10, 2007,
http://97.74.65.51/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=28029.
255 Seth Mydans, Thais Struggle with Violent Insurgency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2007,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/26/world/asia/26
thailand.html.
256 Article 9 of the Sri Lankan Constitution accords the “foremost place” to
Buddhism. See SRI LANKA CONST. ch. 2, § 9, available at http://www.priu.
gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter_02_Amd.html.
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dangerous mix in Sri Lanka and illustrates how, when a religious
group gains political power, it may pursue a discriminatory agenda
against minority faiths.257 The problem with enthroning an official
religion, the religion of the majority, is that this might be seen as a
threat to religious minorities and the ascription to them of secondclass citizenship; this divides, rather than unites. By promoting
the rights of minorities, e.g., through the education system, the
government could undercut accusations that it is seeking to
undermine Islamic culture and in that way facilitate a peaceful
resolution of a tragic situation.
V. CONCLUSION
To accommodate racial and religious minorities in a society,
attention needs to be paid both to constitutional and nonconstitutional solutions, to ensure the protection of the identity
and culture of minorities, their effective participation in
government, and economic development within the framework of
national unity. There is no uniform “one size fits all solution,” as
institutions must fit the needs of the demos, taking into account
their history and other contextual factors. However, certain
measures should be avoided in the interests of ethno-religious
pluralism and social stability. Forcible assimilation and repressive
measures against minority groups, utilizing the “tools of coercion”
left behind by colonial rulers in Asia and Africa, which made
political leaders “careless of cultivating the consent of the ruled,” 258
will only exacerbate conflict and thwart the forging of a durable
peace.
Culture precedes institutions. Thus, an ethos of racial and
257 For example, a Buddhist nationalist group, the Jathika Hela Urumaya
sought to turn Buddhism into the official religion in Sri Lanka and to
discriminate against minority faiths, to enact laws banning missionaries and
penalizing “unethical” conversions of Buddhists. By holding that proselytization
was not a protected religious liberty, the Sri Lanka supreme court truncated the
scope of religious freedom in characterizing health care offered by a Catholic
medical group, which it refused to recognize as an improper “allurement.” See
Lanka Liberty, Brief on Sri Lanka‟s Proposed Anti-Conversion Legislation:
Information,
Observations,
and
Analysis,
http://www.lankaliberty.com/reports/Anti-ConversionLegislationBrief.doc.
258 Yash Ghai, The Theory of the State in the Third World and the
Problematics of Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
TRANSITIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD, 186-196, 191 (Douglas Greenberg et
al. eds., 1993).
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religious tolerance, if not a celebration of racial and religious
diversity as a strength, is a form of unity in diversity united by a
common sense of citizenship and political ideals, and a necessary
partner in producing just peace in divided societies. A sense of
security, of having a stake, is necessary to inculcate a sense of
commitment to the polity. Constitutionalism is closely related to
the process of value formation.
Representative democratic
institutions send a signal of political inclusivity that can help in
the continuing efforts to build democratic values, such as respect
for individual and group freedoms, civic virtues, and
communitarian attitudes on which strong foundations of durable
institutions must rest, towards the public value of securing an
ordered liberty. In the final analysis, one central factor in judging
the quality of a country‟s civilized governance must reside in how it
treats its minorities.
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